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INTRODUCTION
For decades, everyday life for a North Korean has been a
fight to survive a seemingly everlasting food shortage,
widespread starvation, and economic collapse under a repressive
regime.1 Among the struggling North Koreans was Ms. Mi-sun
Bang, a former actress and a widowed mother of three.2 Having
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Fordham University School of Law; B.B.A., 2009, Loyola
Marymount University. The Author would like to thank Professor Carl Minzner for
guiding her through the Note process, imparting his expertise, and sharing his passion.
Most of all, she would like to thank her family for the inspiration, love, and support. In
particular, she would like to thank her loving grandmother, Jin Sook Cho, for her
courage and for being a survivor from the North.
1. See Amartya Sen, Foreword to STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARCUS NOLAND, FAMINE IN
NORTH KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM xvi–xviii (2007) [hereinafter FAMINE IN
NORTH KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM] (discussing the effects of North Korea’s
authoritative and repressive regime in the North Korean famine and widespread
starvation among the North Korean people); RALPH C. HASSIG & KONGDAN OH, THE
HIDDEN PEOPLE OF NORTH KOREA: EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE HERMIT KINGDOM 67 (2009)
[hereinafter HIDDEN PEOPLE] (referring to the collapse of North Korea’s economy in
the 1990s in its discussion of North Korea’s economic policies); DAVID HAWK, U.S.
COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN N. KOR., THE HIDDEN GULAG: THE LIVES AND VOICES OF
“THOSE WHO ARE SENT TO THE MOUNTAINS” 31 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter LIVES AND
VOICES] (noting widespread food shortage in North Korea in the 1990s); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: EVENTS OF 2012, at 341–42 (2013) (stating that
“North Korea “continues to face serious food insecurity in 2012” and discussing the
various reasons that caused the food shortages).
2. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 93 (providing Mrs. Mi-sun Bang’s testimony
of her experiences in North Korea, China, and North Korean prison camps); see
Jansovocmf, 04-29-09 North Korean Defector Interviews Bang Mi Sun, YOUTUBE (May 27,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3ZFRewLCi8 (displaying Mi-sun Bang
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lost her husband to the grips of a merciless famine and driven to
ensure her children’s survival, Ms. Bang fled to China.3 In 1998,
on the heels of the Great Famine in North Korea, Ms. Bang, her
nineteen year old daughter, and her sixteen year old son crossed
the Sino-North Korean border, an act unlawful in both nations.4
Unable to contact her daughter who was studying dance and
acting in Pyongyang, Mi-sun had no choice but to leave her
behind.5
Upon arriving in China, human traffickers captured the
Bang family and threatened to inform Chinese authorities of
their illegal border crossing.6 Fearing repatriation of her family,
Mi-sun conceded to a “brokered marriage,” through which a
disabled Chinese farmer purchased her for 7,000 yuan, or
US$1,000. 7 Now separated from her children, Mi-sun was
kidnapped and trafficked on three separate occasions while in
China. 8 Though Ms. Bang escaped her third husband’s
menacing grasp, as bitter fate would have it, Chinese officials
ultimately repatriated her to North Korea.9
Back in North Korea, Mi-sun was convicted of illegal border
crossing and detained in several North Korean hard labor prison

speaking in Korean about her experiences); see also N.Korean Defector Recalls Being
Tortured in Camp, CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul), May 1, 2009, 11:02 AM,
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2009/05/01/2009050100328.html
[hereinafter N.Korean Defector Recalls Being Tortured].
3. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 93.
4. Id.; see HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 118, 230–31 (noting 1998 as the end of
the three year long North Korean famine of the 1990s, providing the North Korean
Criminal Code, and discussing China’s practice of repatriating North Korean
migrants); see also FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM, supra note 1,
at 225 (discussing China’s repatriation policy regarding North Korean migrants).
5. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 93 (explaining why Ms. Bang was unable to
leave North Korea with all three of her children).
6. Id. (“Apprehended by a gang of traffickers who threatened to turn over her
children to the Chinese police for repatriation, Ms. Bang agreed to a ‘brokered
marriage’ . . . .”).
7. Id. at 93–94 (stating that because of the traffickers’ threats, Ms. Bang entered
into a “brokered marriage” with a handicapped Chinese farmer); see FAMINE IN NORTH
KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM, supra note 1, at 225 (explaining that China
repatriates all North Korean migrants in China).
8. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 94 (stating that Ms. Bang was kidnapped and
trafficked a total of three times and indicating later in her testimony that she was
separated from her children).
9 . Id. (detailing abuse by Ms. Bang’s third “husband” and her eventual
repatriation to North Korea).
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camps. 10 These prison camps were establishments whereby
prison guards were authorized to carry out brutal methods of
punishment.11 When prison guards discovered that Mi-sun was
deteriorating under the pressure of forced labor, they violently
beat her head and body.12 The beatings to her legs were so
severe that Ms. Bang would continue to walk with a limp ten
years later.13 In addition to her permanently mangled leg and
weakened physical state, prison guards apportioned food rations
so small that Mi-sun’s weight plummeted to eighty-eight
pounds.14
One especially unsettling punishment technique was the
practice of forced abortions.15 With no regard to whether they
were voluntary pregnancies or the product of rape or
involuntary marriage, prison guards aborted all pregnancies of
repatriated women suspected of carrying children of Chinese
descent.16 During her imprisonment, Mi-sun witnessed prison
guards force two unsuspecting male inmates to jump up and
down on a board placed over a pregnant woman’s womb.17 As
one might conclude, neither the child nor the mother
10. Id. at 94–96 (describing Ms. Bang’s experience in North Korean prison
camps).
11. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 207–09 (detailing the human rights
abuses in North Korean prison camps); Marcus Noland, North Korea: The Tyranny of
Deprivation, in WORST OF THE WORST: DEALING WITH REPRESSIVE AND ROGUE NATIONS
91 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2007).
12. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 95 (testifying that Ms. Bang was severely
beat when she became physically too weak).
13. Id. (“Her leg became infected to the bone, . . . which caused her to limp
pronouncedly ten years later.”); see N. Korean Defectors Recalls Being Tortured, supra note
2 for a photograph of Bang and her injured leg.
14. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 96 (stating that Ms. Bang’s weight dropped
to eighty-eight pounds); see N.Korean Defector Recalls Being Tortured, supra note 2
(providing a photograph of Bang’s injured leg).
15. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 95 (detailing the forced abortions Mrs.
Bang witnessed). “[A]long with the . . . high levels of deaths in detention . . . a
particularly reprehensible phenomenon of repression is the gender-based sexual
violence and racially motivated forced abortion and infanticide perpetrated against
forcibly repatriated pregnant women.” Id. at 122.
16. Id. at 122–23 (discussing racially motivated forced abortions in North Korean
prison camps). “It makes no difference if the pregnancies resulted from trafficking, or
coerced or voluntary marriages between Korean women and Han Chinese men in
China.” Id. at 123.
17. Id. at 95 (“The guards put her on the floor on her back and placed a board
over her swollen womb, and pistol-whipped two male prisoners until they agreed to
jump up and down on the board.”).
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survived.18 At the completion of an unrelated abortion, a prison
guard offered an explanation to the deplorable practice,
declaring that North Korean women “who got Chinese
sperm . . . brought this on themselves.”19
In a fortunate turn of events, Mi-sun successfully defected
to South Korea following her release from imprisonment,
reunited with her children, and married another North Korean
defector.20 Regrettably, the same cannot be said for countless
repatriated North Koreans who witness similar horrors, as many
will never experience Ms. Bang’s change in luck.21 A byproduct
of North Korea’s criminalization of unauthorized border
crossing and China’s obstinate denial of lawful entry is a
prolonged, if not constant, fear of institutionalized oppression.22
Manifested in Ms. Bang’s testimony, the ramifications of life for
North Korean migrants in China are the risks of endangerment
to their lives, personal safety, and liberty.23
18. Id. at 95 (testifying that both the infant and the mother died from the forced
abortion).
19. Id. at 153 (detailing the testimony of a former detainee who witnessed
multiple forced abortions through injections of the drug ravenol).
20. Id. at 98 (describing events following Ms. Bang’s release from imprisonment
and her subsequent successful defection to South Korea).
21. See id. at 123–47 for first-hand former detainees’ testimonies of human rights
violations in North Korean prison camps; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE
INVISIBLE EXODUS: NORTH KOREANS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 24–28 (2002)
[hereinafter INVISIBLE EXODUS] (detailing accounts of former detainees).
22. See Tsuneo Akaha, Cross-Border Human Flows in Northeast Asia, MIGRATION
INFO. SOURCE (Oct. 1, 2004), http://www.migrati oninformation.org/feature/
print.cfm?ID=257 (noting that North Korean migrants are “under [the] constant fear
of exposure and arrest” while in China); Nicholas Eberstadt & Christopher Griffin,
TIMES
(Feb.
19,
2007),
Saving
North
Korea’s
Refugees,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/19/opinion/19eberstadt.html?pagewanted=allW
www&_r=0 (“As illegal immigrants in China . . . they live in constant fear and at terrible
risk.”); JACQUES L. FUQUA, JR., KOREAN UNIFICATION: THE INEVITABLE CHALLENGES 83
(2007) (explaining that “saeteomin live in constant fear that Chinese authorities or
North Korean agents will apprehend and repatriate them back to North Korea”).
Saeteomin is a Korean term for North Korean migrants or refugees, and literally
translates to “new settler.” YOUNG-YOON KIM, KOR. INST. FOR NAT’L UNIFICATION, A
STUDY ON THE REALITY AND PROSPECT OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN NORTH KOREA: TASKS
FOR SUCCESSFUL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN SYSTEM 2 (March 2007).
23 . See, e.g., U.S. COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN N. KOR., LIVES FOR SALE:
PERSONAL ACCOUNTS OF WOMEN FLEEING NORTH KOREA TO CHINA 28–29 (2009)
[hereinafter LIVES FOR SALE] (detailing personal accounts of the mistreatment North
Korean migrant women in China were forced to suffer); INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note
21, at 2 (“[T]he migrants remain hidden [in China] for fear of discovery, repatriation,
and harsh punishment in North Korea . . . .”); Kaitlin Brush, East Asia, 18 HUM. RTS.
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North Korean migrants are systematically barred from
crossing the Sino-North Korean border into Chinese territory.24
At the outset, enforced by the North Korean Criminal Code,
North Korean citizens do not enjoy the freedom to leave the
nation for China. 25 Accompanying the North Korean law is
China’s policy of automatically repatriating all North Korean
migrants.26 Since North Korean migrants are not authorized to
cross the Sino-North Korean border, the North Korean regime
will punish the repatriated migrant by imprisonment, torture, or
death. 27 Additionally, China denies the United Nations,
nongovernmental organizations (“NGO”), and other human
rights organizations access to North Korean migrants in China
and penalizes persons discovered harboring or providing
assistance to the migrants.28
BRIEF 38, 39 (2010) (stating that “repatriated individuals face imprisonment, torture,
and death”); Alison Carrinski, Note, The Other North Korean Dilemma: Evaluating U.S.
Law Towards North Korean Refugees, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 647, 662–64 (2008)
(noting illegal sex trafficking in China as a significant risk to North Korean women in
China due to the illegal economic migrant status); Elisa Gahng, Note, North Korean
Border-Crossers in Yanbian: The “Protection Gap” Between the Economic Migrant and Refugee
Regime, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 361, 367 (2010) (stating that Chinese officials often beat
North Korean migrants when discovered).
24. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 2 (“To reach China, [North Korean
migrants] have defied their government’s criminal prohibition on illegal exit and
China’s rigorous border controls.”); see also Gahng, supra note 23, at 368 (noting
China’s view that all North Korean migrants in China are economic migrants, and thus
China’s claim that it has a duty to North Korea to repatriate the migrants).
25. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 20–21 for the North Korean Criminal
Code prohibiting unauthorized border crossing; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
NORTH KOREA: FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, OPINION AND EXPRESSION (2009) [hereinafter
NORTH KOREA: FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT]; LIVES FOR SALE, supra note 23, at 14 (stating
that North Korean guards have been ordered to “shoot-to-kill” those attempting to
cross North Korean borders).
26. See Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and
Social Order in the Border Areas, NKFREEDOM, http://www.nkfreedom.org/
UploadedDocuments/NK-China-bilateral_treaty.pdf, at art 4, (last visited Nov. 13. 203)
[hereinafter Repatriation Treaty] (purporting to be an English translation of the
agreement, which is not available in official form) (agreement signed Aug. 12, 1986)
(providing the text of a Sino-North Korean bilateral treaty through which China
promised to repatriate all unauthorized North Korean migrants in China); Gahng,
supra note 23, at 361, 366–68 (discussing the Sino-North Korean bilateral treaty and
China’s repatriation policy to forcibly deport all illegal North Korean migrants).
27. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 20–21 (providing Article 47 and 117 of
the North Korean Criminal Code, punishing illegal border-crossing and defection by
imprisonment or death); Brush, supra note 23.
28. See LEONARD LEO, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2010, at 115 (2010); Alyce S. Ahn, Note, Prosecution or
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China is a contracting party to the United Nation’s 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol (collectively the “Refugee Convention”), an
international treaty governing refugee rights.29 In accordance
with the Refugee Convention, China is prohibited from the
forcible deportation of a “refugee.” 30 Nevertheless, China
maintains that its policy to repatriate North Korean migrants
does not contravene the Refugee Convention.31
First, although the motives for leaving North Korea vary per
migrant from economic reasons to political persecution, China
concludes that all North Korean migrants in China are
“economic migrants.”32 Since the Refugee Convention does not
Persecution: Contradiction Between U.S. Foreign Policy & the Adjudication of Asylum Claims
Involving the Harboring of North Korean Refugees, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 311, 312, 316
(2010) (describing China’s policy of refusing third parties access to North Korean
migrants in China); INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 17 (discussing China’s practice
of arresting those who provide North Korean migrants in China humanitarian aid).
29. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention] for the text of the Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (“1951 Refugee Convention”); Status Table for the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (last visited Nov. 12, 2012),
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~2
&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en [hereinafter U.N. Treaty Collection 1951
Refugee Convention] (showing the date China became a signatory party to the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, or the “1951 Refugee Convention”);
Status Table for the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (last
visited Oct. 12, 20120), http://treaties.un.org/pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx? src=
UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=V-5&chapter=5&lang=en#Participants
[hereinafter U.N. Treaty Collection 1967 Protocol] (showing the date China became a
signatory to the 1967 Protocol, a supplementing treaty to the 1951 Refugee
Convention, collectively the “Refugee Convention”).
30. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, arts. 1, 33 (defining the term
“refugee” in Article 1 and prohibiting repatriation of refugees in Article 33).
31. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 20 (discussing China’s “economic
migrants” classification of North Korean migrants); Ahn, supra note 28, at 316;
INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 16; Gahng, supra note 23, at 370–72 (explaining
that China labels North Korean migrants as “economic migrants” as a justification for
its repatriation policy).
32. See HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM., GLOBAL SECURITY: JAPAN
AND KOREA, 2007-8 H.C. 449, para. 192 (U.K.) (Nov. 12, 2008) [hereinafter GLOBAL
SECURITY] (“The diversity of North Koreans in China means that no single term is
appropriate for the whole population; the FCO notes that those involved are referred
to variously as ‘defectors’, refugees’, ‘escapees’ or ‘border-crossers.’”); see also CONG.EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, 112TH CONG., ANNUAL REP. 2011, at 28 (1st Sess. 2011)
[hereinafter CECC ANNUAL REPORT 2011] (stating that China repatriates North
Korean migrants under its “economic migrant” classification); Jane Kim, Note,
Trafficked: Domestic Violence, Exploitation in Marriage, and the Foreign-Bride Industry, 15 VA.
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extend its protection to those outside their home countries for
purely economic reasons, the migrants fall outside the treaty’s
scope.33 Second, China contends that it is bound by a 1986
bilateral agreement with North Korea whereby China promised
to repatriate all unauthorized North Korean migrants within its
territory.34 China argues that its bilateral treaty obligations to
North Korea preempt its treaty obligations to the United
Nations.35
This Note analyzes China’s justifications for its repatriation
policy and determines if North Korean migrants in China are
“refugees” under the Refugee Convention. It explores whether
China’s repatriation policy concerning North Korean migrants
constitutes a breach of its duties to the Refugee Convention, the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), and China’s
Extradition Law. 36 The Note’s purpose is to determine the
legality of China’s repatriation policy under international law,
emphasize China’s obligations to the United Nations, and
J. INT’L L. 443, 457 (2011) (noting that many women also flee North Korea, not only
for economic reasons, but because of gender, class, and political discrimination); Kyu
Chang Lee, Protection of North Korean Defectors in China and the Convention Against
Torture, 6 REGENT J. INT’L L. 139, 139 (2008) (examining the difference in opinions of
whether North Korean migrants are “refugees” under the Refugee Convention’s
definition).
33. See K.M. GREENHILL, WEAPONS OF MASS MIGRATION: FORCED DISPLACEMENT,
COERCION, AND FOREIGN POLICY 237 (2010) (“Beijing has found a loophole to avoid its
obligations, insisting that the North Koreans are illegal migrants, not refugees.”); Kyu
Chang Lee, supra note 32, at 140–42 (noting that “refugees” who are provided
protection under the Refugee Convention are limited and do not necessarily include
migrants who are outside their home country for economic reasons); see also CECC
ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 32, at 28–29 (“[China] continue[s] [its] policies of
classifying all North Koreans in China as ‘illegal’ economic migrants and repatriating
North Korean refugees in China . . . .”).
34 . Repatriation Treaty, supra note 26; see Carrinski, supra note 23, at 650
(referring to China’s bilateral treaty with North Korea to repatriate all unauthorized
North Korean migrants in China).
35. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 16 (“[China] maintains . . . that its
primary obligation lies under a 1986 agreement with North Korea on the repatriation
of migrants.”); see also Gahng, supra note 23, at 370.
36 . Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
CAT] (providing the text of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, or “CAT”); Extradition Law of the
People’s Republic of China art. 8 (Order No. 42/2000) [hereinafter PRC Extradition
Law], available at http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-09/22/content_68710.htm.
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recommend a pragmatic solution to China’s incongruent
obligations to the United Nations and to North Korea.
First, Part I of the Note introduces the political and social
structure of the North Korean regime and the demanding
conditions of North Korean life. Part I also describes the
Chinese government’s treatment of North Korean migrants and
the risks the migrants face once within China. Second, Part II
examines the Refugee Convention, the CAT, and China’s
Extradition Law, laws that require China to protect the
individuals that conform to the legally defined “refugee” and
migrants at risk of subjection to torture if repatriated. Part II
then analyzes China’s respective duties to its multilateral treaties
with the United Nations, its bilateral agreement with North
Korea, and its domestic law. Finally, Part III asserts that China’s
repatriation policy is a transgression from international law and
proposes that China remove its “economic migrants” blanket
categorization. Part III recommends that China implement
individual assessment procedures, in conformance with the
Refugee Convention, to determine the refugee status of North
Korean migrants in China.
I. THE BACKGROUND CHECK: THE ISOLATED AND
MYSTERIOUS NORTH KOREA AND ITS ENDURING KINSHIP
WITH CHINA
First, Part I.A offers a look inside the secretive State,
summarizing North Korea’s political history and philosophy,
social class structure, and penal system. Then, Part I.B discusses
recent events in North Korea that have required the
international community’s involvement and attention. Part I.B
explores the conditions in North Korea that galvanized mass
North Korean migration into China and briefly discusses several
recent headlines surrounding the ruling dynastic family. Finally,
Part I.C examines China’s relationship with North Korea and
the treatment of North Korean migrants inside Chinese borders.
Part I.C presents China’s repatriation policy with respect to
North Korean migrants and discusses the policy’s effects on the
migrants.
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A. The Hermit Kingdom of the East: A Glimpse into the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea
According to the North Korean government, Kim Il Sung
was the first official leader in 1948 of the newly established oneparty totalitarian state, the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (“DPRK”), commonly known as North Korea. 37 North
Korea’s official history credits Kim Il Sung as the founder of the
nation’s only political party, the Workers’ Party of Korea
(“WPK”). 38 Kim Jong-il, Kim Il Sung’s eldest son, inherited
supreme leadership of North Korea upon his father’s death in
1994 and led the nation until 2011.39 As of 2013, under the rule
of Kim Il Sung’s grandson, Kim Jong-un, North Korea has
maintained its single-party polity.40 A totalitarian leader of the
37. See Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
[DPRK Constitution] Apr. 2009, pmbl., available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/
kn00000_.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (showing the text of the North Korean
Constitution and naming Kim Il Sung as the founder of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, or DPRK); RACHEL A. KOESTLER-GRACK, KIM IL SUNG AND KIM JONG
IL 104 (2004) (stating that Kim Il Sung’s reign began in 1948); BRADLEY K. MARTIN,
UNDER THE LOVING CARE OF THE FATHERLY LEADER: NORTH KOREA AND THE KIM
DYNASTY 430 (St. Martin’s Griffin ed. 2006) (explaining that Kim Il Sung’s regime was
“more totalitarian than Hitler’s” because it was a one-party regime). It is debated if Kim
Il Sung was, in fact, the first leader of North Korea, as some sources claim Kim Yong
Bom was the first official leader. See Ilpyong J. Kim, Kim Jong Il’s Military-First Politics, in
NORTH KOREA: THE POLITICS OF REGIME SURVIVAL 71 (Young Whan Kihl & Hong Nack
Kim eds., 2006) (arguing that Kim Yom Bong was the first leader of North Korea).
38 . Workers’ Party of Korea, NAENARA, http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/great/
political.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). Naenara is the North Korean government’s
official web portal. NAENARA, http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/ (last visited Mar. 31,
2013); Kyungmin Ko et al., The Internet Dilemma and Control Policy: Political and Economic
Implications of the Internet in North Korea, 21 KOR. J. DEF. ANALYSIS 279, 295 (2009)
(stating that Naenara is the North Korean government’s official web portal). See also
PATRICK MCEACHEM, INSIDE THE RED BOX: NORTH KOREA’S POST-TOTALITARIAN
POLITICS 84 (2010) (providing the history of the North Korea Communist Party).
39. See RANDY WOOD & CARMINE DELUCA, DICTATOR’S HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL
MANUAL FOR THE ASPIRING TYRANT 64 (2012) (showing that Kim Jong-il ruled North
Korea from 1994 to 2011); David E. Sanger, Kim Il Sung Dead at Age 82; Led North Korea
5 Decades; Was Near Talks with South, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/09/world/kim-il-sung-dead-at-age-82-led-northkorea-5-decades-was-near-talks-with-south.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm;
see
also
Koestler-Grack, supra note 37 (dating the birth of Kim Il Sung’s first child, Kim Jong-il,
in 1944).
40. See STATE OF TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR i (Gillian Duncan et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter
STATE OF TERRORISM] (stating that today, North Korea still exists as a “totalitarian oneparty state”); Notice to All Party Members, Servicepersons and People, KOREAN CENTRAL
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WPK serves as the head of state and presides as the nation’s
supreme leader.41 The North Korean military is a ruling class
and the “supreme commander of the state, party, and society.”42
Kim Il Sung’s leadership also outlived his death and he remains
as the “eternal President of the Republic.”43
North Korea embraces a political philosophy called Juche, a
derivative of Marxism-Leninism.44 Simply translated, Juche means
self-reliance or self-determination.45 This uniquely North Korean
political philosophy is based on three principles: political
sovereignty, economic independence, and military self-

NEWS AGENCY (Pyongyang) (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/
201112/news19/20111219-04ee.html [hereinafter Notice to All Party Members]
(announcing Kim Jong-un as the new leader of North Korea); North Korea Declares Kim
Jong Un As Country’s New ‘Supreme Leader,’ NBCNEWS.COM (Dec. 29, 2011, 3:07 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/45813667/#.UVeM5av5lcM (reporting that Kim Jong-un,
Kim Jong-il’s son, is the new successor and “supreme leader” of North Korea).
41 . See YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, NORTH KOREA HANDBOOK 87, 379 (2003)
[hereinafter NORTH KOREA HANDBOOK] (describing North Korea as a single-party
dictatorship and noting that the “population is one part of a giant, unified ‘socialist
organism’ . . . created by [a] . . . merging of the supreme leader, party and the
people”). See generally STATE OF TERRORISM, supra note 40.
42. See Ilpyong J. Kim, supra note 37, at 59, 61 (“Kim Jong Il has successfully
transformed North Korea from a party-state system to a military-first political system.”);
see also BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA & JONGRYN MO, HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR,
REVOLUTION AND PEACE, NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC REFORM AND POLITICAL STABILITY
2 (1996).
43. DPRK Constitution, pmbl. (declaring Kim Il Sung as the “eternal President of
the Republic” in the North Korean Constitution). As of 2013, the North Korean
Constitution has been amended a total of six times, the most recent amendment being
in May 2012. MARY BETH NIKITIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34256, NORTH KOREA’S
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: TECHNICAL ISSUES 17 (2013) (“In May 2012, North Korea changed
its constitution to say that it was a ‘nuclear-armed state.’”); N. Korea Calls Itself ‘NuclearArmed State’ in Revised Constitution, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY (Seoul) (May 30, 2012, 8:52
PM), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/05/30/76/0401000000AE
N20120530005200315F.HTML; see also Political System, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
KOREA, http://www.korea-dpr.com/political.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (stating
on North Korea’s official website that Kim Il Sung is the “eternal President of the
Republic”).
44 . See PAUL FRENCH, NORTH KOREA: THE PARANOID PENINSULA: MODERN
HISTORY 30 (2d. ed. 2007) (describing Juche as a derivative of Marxism-Leninism);
Patricia Goedde, Note, Law “Of Our Own Style”: The Evolution and Challenges of the North
Korean Legal System, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1265, 1272 (2004) (noting that North
Korea’s Juche ideology is a reflection of Marxism-Leninism).
45. See Goedde, supra note 44 (translating Juche to mean “self reliance” or “self
determination”); see also French, supra note 44, at 117 (describing North Korea as “a
country with a guiding philosophy of self-reliance and planned self-sufficiency”).
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defense. 46 The North Korean government’s unwillingness to
participate in foreign affairs has led many to describe the nation
as a “hermit kingdom.”47
1. The North Korean Class Structure and Institutionalized
Repression
North Korean citizens are primarily divided into three
classes, which are ranked by loyalty to the regime: the core class
(haek-sim kyechung), the wavering class (tong-yo kyechung), and the
hostile class (jok-tae kyechung). 48 In a population of roughly
twenty-three million people, the core class (i.e. elite members of
the government and ruling party) represents twenty-five to thirty
percent of the people. 49 Fifty percent of the population
embodies the wavering class, which are those who defected from
South Korea after the Korean War, technicians, teachers,
enlisted soldiers, farmers, and former merchants. 50 The
remaining twenty to twenty-five percent is the hostile class.51 The
hostile class members are those whose family members fled to
46. Juche Ideology, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, http://www.koreadpr.com/juche_ideology.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) [hereinafter OFFICIAL DPRK:
JUCHE] (providing on North Korea’s official website that the guiding principles of Juche
are “independence, self-reliance and self-defence”); see Goedde, supra note 44, at 1273
(discussing the three principles of North Korea’s political philosophy).
47. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 4, 172–75 (explaining why North Korea is
nicknamed “the Hermit Kingdom,” as well as discussing the Juche ideology and its
effect on North Korean foreign relations); see also RON FRIDELL, DICTATORSHIP 104
(2007) (describing North Korea as a highly secretive nation that rarely allows foreign
citizens into the country).
48. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 198 (describing the North Korean class
system); see also KONGDAN OH & RALPH C. HASSIG, NORTH KOREA THROUGH THE
LOOKING GLASS 133 (2000) [hereinafter THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS] (listing the
three classes of North Korean society); French, supra note 44, at 42.
49. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 198 (stating that thirty percent of the
North Korean population belongs to the core class); see also French, supra note 44, at 42
(stating that twenty-five percent of the North Korean population falls within the core
class).
50. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 198 (describing the wavering class as
almost the majority of the North Korean population and that it consists of primarily
those who do not belong to the core class or hostile class); see also French, supra note
44, at 42.
51. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 198, 202 (noting that twenty percent of
the North Korean population belongs to the hostile class); THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS, supra note 48, at 133 (estimating that twenty-eight percent of the North Korean
population belongs to the hostile class); see also French, supra note 44, at 42 (claiming
that twenty-five percent of the North Korean population belongs to the hostile class).
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South Korea during the Korean War, defectors, relatives of
defectors, landowners, and any others who carry “political
taint.”52 Hostile class members are refused certain rights, such as
rights to obtain education, employment, and medical services.53
Human rights organizations consistently rank North Korea
as one of the worst human rights violators in the world.54 North
Korea does not afford its citizens freedom of expression,
movement, or organization.55 Opposition to the supreme leader
or to the regime is severely punished and the government
meticulously controls and limits access to media and
information.56 The regime offers virtually no due process, trial,
or judicial review. 57 Crimes ranging from murder to mere
52. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 198, 202 (describing the hostile class);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A MATTER OF SURVIVAL: THE NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S
CONTROL OF FOOD AND THE RISK OF HUNGER 6 (2006) [hereinafter A MATTER OF
SURVIVAL] (“Those labeled members of the ‘hostile’ class, such as former landowners,
collaborators during the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula, and families of
defectors and escapees who made their way to South Korea, are at the bottom of the
state’s priorities.”).
53. See KOR. INST. FOR NAT’L UNIFICATION, WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NORTH KOREA 2005, at 108 (2005) [hereinafter KINU WHITE PAPER 2005] (describing
the rights denied to hostile class members in North Korea); see also JIYOUNG SONG,
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSES IN NORTH KOREA: POST-COLONIAL, MARXIST AND
CONFUCIAN PERSPECTIVES 103 (2011).
54 . See, e.g., North Korea, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://www.freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013 (last visited Jan. 20, 2013, 3:00 PM)
(noting that in its 2013 publication of Freedom in the World, North Korea was included as
one of the nine out of forty seven countries considered as “not free” to have the lowest
possible rating for political rights and civil liberties); see also GLOBAL SECURITY, supra
note 32, para. 175 (“We conclude that the North Korean regime is one of the worst
human rights abusers in the world . . . .”).
55. See N. Kor. Human Rights: An Update: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Asia, the
Pacific, and the Global Env’t of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 6 (2007)
(statement of Eni Faleomavaega, Chairman, Subcomm. on Asia, the Pacific, and the
Global Env’t) [hereinafter Hearing: North Korean Human Rights] (stating “North
Koreans have no freedom of expression or movement”); see also NORTH KOREA:
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, supra note 26.
56 . See RHODA MARGESSON et al., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34189, NORTH
KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
AND U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 8 (2007) [hereinafter CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE]
(discussing the ban on any dissent of the supreme leader, the lack of access to media,
and the “severe physical abuse meted out to citizens who violate laws and restrictions”);
see also ANDREW SCOBELL, KIM JONG IL AND NORTH KOREA: THE LEADER AND THE
SYSTEM 30 (2006) (discussing the North Korean government’s restrictions on North
Korean access to media sources and information).
57. See PAOLO CAMMAROTA ET AL., LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING HUMAN
RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 16 (2007) (“Government security forces routinely arrest and
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familial relations with a defector will result in incarceration in a
hard labor prison camp.58 The State often arbitrarily detains
persons and imposes sentences as severe as lifetime
imprisonment and death.59
2. The North Korean Penal System
The North Korean prison system is divided into four
categories of hard labor penal facilities, or gulags.60 Kwan-li-so
prison camps, or long-term political penal colonies, imprison
political dissidents, together with up to three generations of the
relatives of political offenders. 61 Kyo-hwa-so penitentiaries are
long-term institutions that detain individuals charged with
criminal and political felonies.62 Jip-kyeol-so facilities are shortimprison persons, holding them incommunicado without any possibility of a fair trial
or judicial review.”); see also JOYCE HART, KIM JONG IL: LEADER OF NORTH KOREA 103
(2008) (noting the absence of due process in North Korea’s penal system); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012: EVENTS OF 2011, at 356 (2012) (listing arbitrary
arrest and detention and the lack of due process as some of North Korea’s violations of
basic human rights); Ibp Usa, NORTH KOREA: GENERAL SECRETARY KIM JONG IL
HANDBOOK 89 (2011) (explaining that the North Korean Central Court does not have
the power of judicial review over executive and legislative actions).
58. Imprisonment as a result of the individual’s familial relations to the defector is
known as “guilt-by-association.” IAN JEFFRIES, NORTH KOREA: A GUIDE TO ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 18 (2006) (noting that thousands of North Koreans
have been imprisoned solely for a relative’s violation of a law under the theory of guiltby-association); see also MIKE KIM, ESCAPING NORTH KOREA: DEFIANCE AND HOPE IN THE
WORLD’S MOST REPRESSIVE COUNTRY 113 (2010); Cammarota, supra note 57, at 17
(explaining that “guilt-by association” is “the idea of ‘collective responsibility’ whereby
multiple generations of the offender’s family are also imprisoned”); INVISIBLE EXODUS,
supra note 21, at 24.
59. See PAUL CLOSE & DAVID ASKEW, ASIA PACIFIC AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GLOBAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE 4 (2004) (listing the North Korean regime’s usage of
torture, the death penalty, and arbitrary detention and imprisonment as “serious
human rights violations”); Cammarota, supra note 57, at 16 (noting that the North
Korean government often arrests prisoners absent any judicial process or explanation
and then imposes lifetime sentences in hard labor camps).
60. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at xi, 9 (describing the North Korean
penal system as a “gulag system” and distinguishing the different North Korean prison
facilities); see also Kita Choa Ch Kikokusha no Seimei to Jinken o Mamoru Kai, LIFE &
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA, SOCIETY TO HELP RETURNEES TO NORTH KOREA, 34–
36 (2003) (providing an in-depth discussion on the North Korean detention systems);
Cammarota, supra note 57, at 16–19; INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 22, at 23–24.
61. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 9 (describing Kwan-li-so prison camps);
see also Cammarota, supra note 57, at 17–18.
62. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 9 (describing kyo-hwa-so penitentiary
camps); see also Cammarota, supra note 58, at 19.
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term prison centers that incarcerate those who have committed
criminal and political misdemeanors. 63 Ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae
“mobile labor brigades” are short-term labor camps instituted to
accommodate the overcrowding of repatriated individuals
within the other prisons.64
The type of offense committed is used to further identify
the varying degrees of punishment to follow.65 Particularly, the
regime distinguishes political offenses as especially
contemptible. 66 For example, irrespective of the detainee’s
initial motives for border crossing, subsequent contact with a
South Korean citizen or a religious organization is perceived as
an anti-state act and a political offense.67 A repatriated migrant
charged as a non-political offender is incarcerated in the shortterm jip-kyeol-so or ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae facilities.68 A repatriated
63. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 9, 121 (providing an alternate spelling
to jip-kyeol-so and stating that “jip-kyul-so shorter-term detention facilities” detain
individuals for misdemeanor-level offenses, both criminal and political); see also
Cammarota, supra note 57, at 19.
64. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 9, 121 (describing ro-dong-danryeon-dae
“mobile labor brigades”); see also Cammarota, supra note 57, at 19.
65. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 120–47 (detailing the different types of
detention centers for those repatriated from China and providing testimony from
former detainees); see also STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARCUS NOLAND, WITNESS TO THE
TRANSFORMATION: REFUGEE INSIGHTS INTO NORTH KOREA 92 (2011) [hereinafter
WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION] (providing a table that illustrates the North
Korean prison system).
66. See DAVID HAWK, U.S. COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN N. KOR., EXPOSING
NORTH KOREA’S PRISON CAMPS: PRISONERS’ TESTIMONIES AND SATELLITE
PHOTOGRAPHS 12 (2003) [hereinafter EXPOSING NORTH KOREA’S PRISON CAMPS]
(explaining that North Korea views contact with a South Korean as a political offense);
LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 119–20 (detailing North Korean penal system
procedures in detaining repatriated North Koreans believed to have committed a
political offense); see also Cammarota, supra note 58, at 62 (noting North Korea’s
implementation of capital punishment for political offenders).
67. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 8, 25, 86, 120–22 (explaining that
contact with South Koreans, Korean-Americans, or religious institutions is considered
“hostile” to the regime and an “anti-state” act); see also INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note
21, at 2 (“Migrants who . . . have any contact with South Koreans or other non-Chinese
foreigners, including missionaries and humanitarian workers . . . are liable to severe
punishments, even including death, if discovered and returned to North Korea.”).
68. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 120–21 (explaining that repatriated
migrants from China who are charged with only the crime of illegal border crossing
with no political component are imprisoned at the short-term prison facilities);
WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 98 (“[L]egal treatment of border
crossing . . . was demoted from the equivalent of treason to a misdemeanor offense for
those showing no political motives.”).
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North Korean migrant charged with one of the ideological
offenses, however, is imprisoned in a long-term kwan-li-so or kyohwa-so prison.69
To determine the level of punishment, North Korean
officials first interrogate the repatriated upon their arrival.70
North Korean authorities extensively inquire into the migrant’s
motives for departure and conduct in China to establish if the
individual committed any political offenses. 71 These
interrogation centers employ methods of physical abuse and
public humiliation to compel repatriated migrants to confess to
political crimes. 72 Once the authorities are content with the
detainee’s confessions, the migrant is sent to the appropriate
prison facility based on the type and level of the crime
committed.73
The North Korean government has never admitted to the
existence of these hard labor prison facilities.74 In fact, North
69. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 120 (explaining that repatriated
individuals who are found to have come into contact with a South Korean or Christian
will be sent to a kwan-li-so or kyo-hwa-so prison facility); see also INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra
note 21, at 24; WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATIOn, supra note 65, at 92–93 (illustrating
in a table and discussing the North Korean prison system).
70. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 119–20 (describing the process of
interrogation of the repatriated North Koreans); WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATIOn,
supra note 65, at 29, 92–93.
71. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 119–20 (describing North Korea’s
interrogation procedures to determine if the migrant’s reason for leaving or conduct in
China had a political component); WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65,
at 29, 92–93 (“A defector who is sent back to North Korea is subject to interrogation
and investigation . . . . If the [National Security Agency] concludes that the defector
crossed the border for economic reasons, the new code stipulates sentences of up to
two years of ‘labor correction.’”).
72 . See supra note 71 and accompanying text (detailing North Korean
interrogation techniques).
73. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 120 (“If the case has a political
component-if the person admits to having met South Koreans or watched South
Korean TV or movies, or sometimes having gone to a Korean-Chinese church,
the . . . police retain detainee.”); WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at
29, 92–93 (providing a chart illustrating the detention centers and sentences for
prisoners detained for political offenses).
74. See Chico Harlan, South Korean Report Details Alleged Abuses at North Korea’s
Prison Camps, WASH. POST, (May 9, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
south-korean-report-details-alleged-abuses-at-north-koreas-prison-camps/2012/05/09/
gIQA794LDU_story.html (stating that “North Korea officially denies the existence of
such camps”); Stephanie Nebehay, North Korea Blurs Lines Between Prison Camps, Villages:
Amnesty, REUTERS, (Mar. 6, 2013, 10:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/
03/07/us-korea-north-amnesty-idUSBRE92600820130307.
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Korea adamantly rejects such allegations.75 Despite the regime’s
denial of a state-run network of gulags, numerous witness and
former prisoner testimonies and satellite images indicate that
the North Korean regime has created a nationwide gulag system
consisting of at least six political penal camps.76 In 2012, the
Korea Institute for National Unification (“KINU”) estimated
that about 150,000 to 200,000 prisoners were currently detained
in one of the six North Korean hard labor gulags.77 The 2012
KINU report further states, “[t]he South Korean government
reported to the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee
that there were ‘an estimated 154,000 political prisoners
detained in six Political Concentration Camps’ throughout
North Korea.”78
3. A Look Inside North Korea’s Secret Gulags
Within the North Korean penal camps, prison guards assign
prisoners to forced labor under formidable conditions.79 These
75. See supra note 75 and accompanying text for the reports of the North Korean
government’s denial of the existence of the hard labor prison camps.
76. See generally LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1 (offering an in-depth report on
North Korean gulags, with first-hand testimonies by witnesses and former gulag
inmates, computer-generated images of the hard labor prison facilities originally handdrawn by former prison inmates, and satellite images of the locations); see also UN ‘to
Investigate N.Korean Prison Camps,’ CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul) (Mar. 26, 2013, 9:45 AM),
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/03/26/2013032600604.html
(“It’s possible to take [North Korean leader] Kim Jong-un to the [International
Criminal Court] just through analysis of various data including satellite images and
interviews with some 25,000 defectors in South Korea.”) (quoting Ha Tae-kyoung,
South Korean lawmaker of the Saenuri Party, a major political party of the South
Korean government).
77. The Korea Institute for National Unification (“KINU”) is a South Korean
research institute funded by the South Korean government, “the hub of research on
North Korea[,] and unification and a locus for the international network on Korean
peninsula issues.” Mission & History, KOREA INST. NAT’L UNIFICATION,
http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/about/about_02_01.jsp (last visited Apr. 4, 2013); KOR.
INST. FOR NATIONAL UNIFICATION, WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA
2012, at 147 [hereinafter KINU WHITE PAPER 2012].
78. KINU WHITE PAPER 2012, supra note 77, at 148; see Jeffries, supra note 58, at
163 (“North Korea holds some 154,000 political prisoners in six large camps across the
country, according to South Korean government estimates.”).
79. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at xi, 162 (discussing some methods of
torture and punishment executed by guards onto prisoners as “causing great suffering
and injury to . . . mental health” and describing the labor camps as a “gulag system”).
“The severe working conditions imposed on deliberately underfed prisoners,
particularly in the mining and lumber processing sectors of the labor camps (which
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hard labor gulags expose prisoners to high risks of mental harm,
physical injury, and death.80 Further, prison food ration systems
allocate to each prisoner portions of food, such as corn powder
or cabbage-based gruel, that fall far below subsistence level.81
The US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
(“HRNK”) found that the prison camps intentionally implement
“the regimen of chronic semi-starvation provid[ing] only
enough food to [keep prisoners] perpetually on the verge of
starvation” in order to “generate[] large numbers of informants
among the prisoners, leading to a prison-camp culture of
extreme distrust and hostility.”82
Grueling labor requirements and meager food portions
compel prisoners to scavenge for rats, tree bark, snakes, and
grass to stave off starvation, illness, and death. 83 Critically
lead to a large number of industrial accidents and deaths) could also be deemed ‘other
inhuman acts.’” Id. See also Jeffries, supra note 58, at 90 (reporting that in North Korean
prison camps “hundreds of thousands of prisoners work, often to their deaths”);
WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 95 (stating that in North Korean
prison camps, the “conditions in the facilities . . . even have a psychological impact, in
effect terrorizing those who are detained”).
80 . See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the physical and
psychological impact of the North Korean prison camps).
81. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 86 (explaining that prisoners are fed
very small meals, keeping prisoners constantly on the verge of starvation). “Former
Prisoner #37 was given boiled corn husks, corn powder gruel and some soybeans in a
dirty plastic bowl.” Id.; see also North Korean Prison Camps Are ‘Like Hitler’s Auschwitz’,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 20, 2013, 6:59 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/survivorsliken-north-korean-prison-camps-to-holocaust-2013-2 (providing one former prisoner’s
description of prison camp meals as “tiny rations of mainly cabbage-based gruel”).
82. The U.S. Committee on Human Rights in North Korea (“HRNK”) is a
nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) comprised of “a distinguished group of
foreign policy and human rights specialists” whose purpose is to advocate for human
rights in North Korea. About HRNK, COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN N. KOR.,
http://www.hrnk.org/about/about-hrnk.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2013). LIVES AND
VOICES, supra note 1, at 31, 33; see also NANCY DZIEDZIC, WORLD POVERTY 59 (2006)
(“[F]eeding prisoners the absolute bare minimum creates an atmosphere of distrust
and suspicion among [the prisoners], making them fight each other for extra scraps of
food and the clothing of those who have died.”); Martin, supra note 37, at 567
(discussing the extremely small meal rations and stating that a former North Korean
labor camp prisoner believed that “in a state-operated prison camp, I guess the
authorities try to keep the prisoners eating barely enough to sustain life”); WITNESS TO
THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 97 (showing that many North Korean
detainees witnessed forced starvation within the prison camps).
83. See Cammarota, supra note 57, at 18 (explaining how North Korean prison
inmates supplement their diets in order to survive); HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at
207.
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malnourished and ill equipped for extreme working conditions,
many prison inmates exhibit physical deformities, such as
emaciated physiques, hunched backs, and missing limbs. 84
Electric shock, rape, water torture, forcing prisoners to severely
beat up on one another, medical experimentation, forced
abortions, and infanticide are some methods of punishment
used within the North Korean penal camps.85 One HRNK report
revealed that inmates caught attempting to escape were publicly
executed and guards often forced other prisoners to participate
in the execution.86
Moreover, state-perpetuated gender-based violence, often
propelled by racially motivated discrimination, is commonplace
in the North Korean penal system.87 Former prisoners reported
that guards perform abortions by kicking a woman in the
stomach, pinning a pregnant woman to the ground and
jumping directly onto her stomach, placing wooden planks on
top of the mother’s stomach and forcing male prisoners to jump
up and down on the plank, and injecting women’s wombs with
concentrations of the drug ravenol. 88 Others have witnessed
guards commit infanticides by wrapping several premature
babies in newspaper and burying them alive, beating infants to
84. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 207 (describing detainees as “walking
skeletons”); Jeffries, supra note 58, at 28 (“Many prisoners are stunted and deformed
from back-breaking work, twelve hours a day, seven days a week . . . .”); LIVES AND
VOICES, supra note 1, at 31 (describing physical harm to prisoners caused by the
conditions of North Korean penal camps).
85. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPS. ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
2008, S. PRT. 111-60, at 865 (2d Sess. 2010) (“Defectors continued to report that many
prisoners died from torture, disease, [and] starvation . . . .”); Cammarota, supra note
57, at 16, 22 (describing North Korean prison camp punishment techniques); LIVES
AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 4, 33, 94–5, 124, 126, 142, 152–54 (discussing the harsh
punishments imposed for relatively minor rule infractions); WITNESS TO THE
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 96–97.
86. Cammarota, supra note 57, at 18; see LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 33
(discussing an instance where prison guards forced other prisoners to participate in the
public execution of another prisoner).
87. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 122–23 (discussing racially motivated
gender-based violence inside North Korean prison camps); see also CITIZENS’ ALLIANCE
FOR NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS, THE BATTERED WHEEL OF THE REVOLUTION:
BRIEFING REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST NORTH KOREAN WOMEN
50–54 (2011) (discussing State perpetuated gender-based violence in North Korean
prison camps).
88. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 94, 152–54 for first-hand testimony by
former inmates; see also INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 22, at 23–24.
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death, using forceps to stab newborns in the skull, and throwing
newborn infants into plastic boxes and leaving them to die.89
B. North Korea in the International Spotlight: The Great Famine of the
1990s and the Kim Family Dynasty
Despite North Korea’s isolationist policies under Juche
thought, the nation has found itself increasingly entwined in
foreign relations. 90 Economic collapse and successive natural
disasters have necessarily required foreign aid. 91 Moreover,
North Korea’s recent militant threats and unpredictable
behavior have called for heightened international intervention
and involvement.92
89. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 4, 124, 126, 152–53 for first-hand
testimony by former inmates; see also James Brooke, N. Koreans Talk of Baby Killings, N.Y.
TIMES (June 10, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/10/world/n-korean s-talkof-baby-killings.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
90. See, e.g., STEPHAN HAGGARD, MARCUS NOLAND, & ERIK WEEKS, NORTH KOREA
ON THE PRECIPICE OF FAMINE 3 (2008) [hereinafter NORTH KOREA ON THE PRECIPICE
OF FAMINE] (“North Korea is critically dependent at the margin on external sources of
supply . . . [and North Korea’s] pursuit of self-sufficiency has always been
fundamentally misguided.”); HELGA TURKU, ISOLATIONIST STATES IN AN
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 74, 122–23 (2009) (recognizing North Korea’s isolationist
policies, but also observing that North Korea had received “substantial humanitarian
aid” from the European Union, negotiated with the United States, South Korea, and
Japan “to receive up to half a million tons” of fuel, and attempted to “normalize
[international] relations” by “promising a range of changes in exchange for aid and
international recognition”); see also HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 250 (noting North
Korea’s “policy of isolation”); OFFICIAL DPRK: JUCHE, supra note 46 (emphasizing on
the North Korean official website the importance of political and economic selfreliance and independence under the Juche ideology).
91. See MARK E. MANYIN & MARY BETH NIKITIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40095,
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA 2–3 (2012) (discussing a United States
humanitarian aid program provided to North Korea from 1995 to 2003 and stating that
it was reinstated in 2007); North Korea Blames Global Warming for Natural Disasters,
RELIEFWEB (Aug. 21, 2002), http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republickorea/north-korea-blames-global-warming-natural-disasters (reporting on the repeated
natural disasters beginning in the 1990s); HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1 (discussing the
subsequent collapse of North Korea’s economy following the mid 1990s famine);
NORTH KOREA ON THE PRECIPICE OF FAMINE, supra note 90 (noting North Korea’s
“critical dependence” on foreign aid).
92. See Press Release, Bureau of Int’l Sec. & Nonproliferation, United States
Sanctions Individuals Linked to North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
(Mar. 8, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/205879.htm (last visited Mar.
31, 2013) (discussing UN Security Council sanctions imposed on North Korea in 2006,
2009, and 2013 following three missile and nuclear tests in each of the respective
years); Louis Charbonneau & Michelle Nichols, US, China Agree on UN Sanctions Draft on
North Korea, NBCNEWS (Mar. 5, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://worldnews.nbcne ws.com/
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1. The Great Famine in North Korea
During the 1990s, large numbers of individuals crossed
North Korean borders into China to flee a persistent and deadly
famine.93 The mid-1990s national food crisis was partly caused by
structural issues starting in the early 1980s with North Korea’s
food rationing system, the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union
that caused North Korea to lose forty percent of all its imports,
decline in trade with China following normalization of SinoSouth Korean relations in the early 1990s, and successive
calamitous natural disasters in North Korea between 1994 and
1997.94 North Korea’s Great Famine, which resulted in a death
toll of massive scale, is recognized to be one of the worst famines
of the twentieth century.95
Numerical estimates of the total deaths caused by the Great
Famine vary greatly.96 While North Korean officials contend that

_news/2013/03/05/17194138-us-china-agree-on-un-sanctions-draft-on-north-korea?lite
(reporting that “the United States and China reached a deal that ‘significantly
expands’ U.N. sanctions on North Korea for its third nuclear test”).
93 . See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-691, HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE: STATUS OF NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND ASYLUM IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (2010) (stating that famine in North Korea in the 1990s “compelled a
large number . . . to leave”); RÜDIGER FRANK, KOREA 2010: POLITICS, ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY 161 (2010); North Korea ‘Loses 3 Million to Famine,’ BRITISH BROADCASTING
CORP. (Feb. 17, 1999, 11:20 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/281132.stm
[hereinafter North Korea Loses 3 Million] (reporting on the estimated massive death toll
resulting from the North Korean famine of the mid 1990s).
94. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, STARVED OF RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
FOOD CRISIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA) 6
(2004) [hereinafter STARVED OF RIGHTS] (discussing the causes of the Great Famine in
North Korea); STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARCUS NOLAND, HUNGER AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
POLITICS OF FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA 14 (2005) [hereinafter POLITICS OF FAMINE IN
NORTH KOREA] (discussing the collapse of North Korea’s Public Distribution System in
the late 1980s and the early 1990s); KOREA: THE EAST ASIAN PIVOT 124 (Jonathan D.
Pollack ed., 2004) (stating that the “fall in imports [to North Korea] from Russia in
1991 was equivalent to 40 percent of all [North Korean] imports” and that “a
disillusioned China reduced its exports to North Korea,” which it claims to be “the
single proximate trigger to the North Korean famine”).
95. See LEE ALLYN DAVIS, NATURAL DISASTERS 130 (2008) (stating that the North
Korean famine of the 1990s was “one of the worst famines of modern times”); FAMINE
IN NORTH KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM, supra note 1, at 17 (describing the
North Korean famine in the 1990s as ranking “among the most destructive of the
twentieth century”); Manyin, supra note 91, at 13 (“A severe famine in the mid-1990s
killed an estimated 600,000 to 3 million North Koreans.”).
96. See SUK LEE, THE GREAT FAMINE OF 1994-2000: EXISTENCE AND IMPACT 21
(2005) (discussing the greatly differing numerical estimates of the total deaths
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the Great Famine claimed a total of 220,000 lives between 1995
and 1998, the US House of Representatives’ International
Relations Committee estimates that 300,000 to 800,000 people
died per year, totaling 900,000 to 2.4 million famine deaths.97 In
contrast to Western reports, South Korean officials revealed a
lower figure of 270,000 total famine casualties between 1995 and
1998.98 Further, some research institutes and notable experts
calculate an approximate range of 600,000 to 1 million Great
Famine fatalities.99
The food shortages, mass starvation, disease, and deaths
that began with the Great Famine lingered on well after 1998
and into the 2000s, forcing North Korea to continue to rely
heavily on foreign aid.100 Still today, the nation has yet to fully
resulting from the Great Famine); see also POLITICS OF FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA, supra
note 95, at 9.
97. See Andrew Natsios, The Dangers of the Coming North Korean Famine, U.S. NEWS
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2012/11/12/
the-political-consequences-of-famine-in-north-korea (stating that as many as 2.5 million
people were killed from famine during the Great Famine of the 1990s); Jeffries, supra
note 58, at 452 (discussing North Korea’s contention that a total of 220,000 people
died between 1995 and 1998 from famine); see also Henry Chu, U.S. Officials Report
TIMES,
Aug.
20,
1998,
Horror
of
N.
Korea
Famine,
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/aug/20/news/mn-14860 (stating, in 1998, that US
officials reported that 300,000 to 800,000 North Koreans died each year starting in
1995); FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM, supra note 1, at 73
(stating that the North Korean government estimated a total 220,000 Great Famine
deaths between 1995 and 1998); Jeffries, supra note 58, at 58 (discussing the US House
of Representatives’ International Relations Committee’s estimate that 300,000 to
800,000 North Koreans died each year between 1995 and 1998).
98. See Lee Soo-Jeong, 270,000 North Koreans Have Died From Famine, Says South,
RELIEFWEB (Aug. 27, 1999), http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republickorea/270000-north-koreans-have-died-famine-says-south (reporting South Korea’s
official estimate of 270,000 total Great Famine deaths); Report: 270,000 North Koreans
Killed by Famine From 1995 to 1998, AMARILLO (Aug. 27, 1999), http://amarillo.com/
stories/082799/usn_LA0783.001.shtml (reporting on South Korea’s official estimate of
total North Korean famine casualties between 1995 and 1998).
99. See KINU WHITE PAPER 2012, supra note 77, at 345 (providing KINU’s estimate
of 580,000 to 1,120,000 total deaths from the Great Famine); POLITICS OF FAMINE, supra
note 94, at 18 (providing Stephan Haggard’s and Marcus Noland’s belief that more
“plausible” studies by analysts “suggest between 600,000 and 1 million excess deaths”);
Suk Lee, supra note 96, at 46–47 (providing the analysis used to determine the
estimated 600,000 to 1 million famine death toll range); see also A MATTER OF SURVIVAL,
supra note 52, at 9 (stating that “demographic and economic experts use one million as
a reasonable estimate” of North Korea’s Great Famine).
100. See KINU WHITE PAPER 2012, supra note 100, at 335 (explaining that,
although foreign aid to North Korea and grain production increased in 2000 and 2001,
respectively, “chronic food shortages within North Korea persisted”); MANYIN &
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recover.101 In 2012, Japanese and South Korean media reported
that a large-scale famine in North Korea had resurfaced, though
to what extent remains speculative.102
2. North Korean President Kim Jong-un
On December 17, 2011, enigmatic supreme leader Kim
Jong-il died of a heart attack at sixty-nine years of age, officially
ending his seventeen-year reign over North Korea. 103
Immediately following his passing, Kim’s youngest son and
designated heir to the dynastic regime, Kim Jong-un, presided as
North Korea’s new supreme leader.104 Since the leadership shift,
NIKITIN, supra note 91, at 13 (explaining that the United States provided North Korea
with food aid from 1995 to 2003, which resumed again in 2007); POLITICS OF FAMINE IN
NORTH KOREA, supra note 94, at 15 (illustrating a chart showing North Korean food
imports and aids from 1990 to 2003).
101. See Korea, Democratic People’s Republic (DPRK), WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME,
http://www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-republic-dprk (last visited
Dec. 1, 2012) (“In July 2012, WFP resumed its ‘Nutrition Support to Women and
Children in the [DPRK]’ operation, which seeks to combat continued hunger and
under-nutrition among children and their mothers . . . .”); MANYIN & NIKITIN, supra
note 91, at 13 (“Since 1995, the international community has donated over 12 million
MT of food aid to North Korea to help North Korea alleviate chronic, massive food
shortages that began in the early 1990s.”); POLITICS OF FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA, supra
note 100 (demonstrating that foreign food imports to North Korea continued into the
2000s).
102. See Aid Worker Says North Korea May Be Facing New Food Crisis, ASAHI SHIMBUN
(Osaka), Aug. 30, 2012, http://ajw.asah i.com/article/asia/korean_peninsula/
AJ201208300106 (“North Korea could be heading towards a crisis similar to the 1990s
when a million people are thought to have died . . . .”); N. Korean Famine ‘Worst in Over
20 Years,’ CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul), Oct. 15, 2012, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/
html_dir/2012/10/15/2012101501435.html; N. Korean Farmer Cites Grave Drought; Aid
Unlikely,
Korea
Herald
(Seoul)
(May
29,
2012,
8:02
PM),
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20120529000957; Report: Famine Hit
N.Korea’s Rice Basket in 2012, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Osaka) (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/korean_peninsula/AJ201302070094.
103. Kim Jong Il Passes Away, KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (Pyongyang) (Dec.
19, 2011), http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201112/news19/20111219-02ee.html
(announcing to North Korean citizens Kim Jong-il’s passing); see Medical Analysis of Kim
Jong Il’s Demise, KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (Pyongyang) (Dec. 19, 2011),
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201112/news19/20111219-03ee.html
(reporting
that the cause of Kim Jong-il’s death was a heart attack); see also North Korean Leader Kim
Jong-il Dies ‘of Heart Attack’, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORP.(Dec. 19, 2011, 7:53AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16239693.
104. Korean Central News Agency of the DPRK (“KCNA”) is a state-run news
agency and North Korea’s only news agency provided to North Korean citizens. NORTH
KOREA HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 416; see also JAMES E. HOARE, HISTORICAL
DICTIONARY OF DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 231 (2012). Notice to All
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Kim Jong-un’s regime has kept the world on its toes by
developing its nuclear proliferation programs, reneging on the
1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, declaring a “state of war”
with South Korea, and threatening the United States with
ballistic missile attacks.105 While the global community’s focus
remained on North Korea’s militaristic and unconventional
tactics, North Korea’s treatment of its own citizens worsened; the
brutality of punishments for attempted border crossing
surpassed what was observed during Kim Jong-il’s rule. 106
Party Members, supra note 41 (revealing on the same day of announcing Kim Jong-il’s
death that Kim Jong-un had succeeded leadership over North Korea, and describing
Kim Jong-un as the “great successor to the revolutionary cause of Juche and
outstanding leader of our party, army and people); see Holly Yan & Atika Shubert, Kim
Jong Un: The ‘Great Successor’ Remains an Enigma, CNN (Dec. 19, 2011, 11:32 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/19/world/asia/kim-jong-un-profile; see also Liu Ming,
Changes and Continuities in Pyongyang’s China Policy, in NORTH KOREA IN TRANSITION:
POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY 211 (Kyung-Ae Park & Scott Snyder eds., 2013)
(stating that during a North Korean party conference, Kim Jong-un was informally
designated as Kim Jong-il’s heir apparent); Kongdan Oh & Ralph Hassig, North Korea in
2009: The Song Remains the Same, 50 ASIAN SURVEY 89, 96 (2010) (describing Kim Jongun as Kim Jong-il’s youngest son); HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 2 (describing North
Korea as a “dynastic dictatorship”).
105. The 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement was a truce signed between North
Korea and the People’s Republic of Korea (South Korea) to enforce a cease-fire.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES, OUR DOCUMENTS: 100 MILESTONE DOCUMENTS FROM THE
NATIONAL ARCHIVES 204 (2003). The Korean Armistice Agreement is not a peace treaty
and North Korea and South Korea are technically still at war. Id.; MARITIME
CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES IN ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY 13 (Joshua
Ho et al. eds., 2013); see, e.g., Masamito Aoki & Mizuho Aoki, Defiant North Korea
Launches Rocket, JAPAN TIMES (Minato) (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2012/12/13/national/defiant-north-korea-launches-rocket/#.UVe20qv5lcM
(reporting on North Korea’s December 2012 rocket launch into the Earth’s orbit);
North Korea Says It Is in a ‘State of War’ with South, GUARDIAN (London) (Mar. 29, 2013,
9:10 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2 013/mar/30/north-korea-state-warsouth-korea (reporting on North Korea declaring a “state of war” with South Korea);
N.Korea: ‘Time Has Come to Settle Accounts’ with United States, CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul), Mar.
30,
2013, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/03/30/20130330
00343. html (covering North Korea’s March 2013 threats of missile attacks on the
United States); North Korea Conducted an Underground Nuclear Test; South Korea on High
Alert, HAARETZ (Tel Aviv) (Feb. 12, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/
world/north-korea-conducted-an-underground-nuclear-test-south-korea-on-high-alert1.503002 (reporting on North Korea’s February 2013 underground nuclear test); Rocket
Launch Fails, North Korea Eyes N-Test, TIMES OF INDIA (Mumbai)(Apr. 14, 2012, 2:38
AM), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-04-14/rest-of-world/31341715_
1_long-range-rocket-north-korea-founding-president-kim-il-sung
(detailing
North
Korea’s failed April 2012 attempted missile launch).
106. See KINU WHITE PAPER 2012, supra note 99, at 525 (“It has further been
reported that the persecution of defector families has become worse since Kim Jong-un
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Foreign media reported that North Korean border officials were
now equipped with orders to “shoot-to-kill” attempted bordercrossers, that punishments for repatriated North Koreans and
their families had increased in severity, and that North Korean
prison camps and prison guards had expanded in size and
numbers.107
C. The Enduring Kinship: The PRC-DPRK Alliance and Its
Implications for North Korean Migrants in China
For more than a half-century, North Korea has enjoyed a
unique kinship with the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”),
the isolated nation’s most important ally.108 Political scientists
recognize the PRC-DPRK alliance as one-sided, noting that
“China makes all the sacrifices—providing crucial political and
diplomatic backing, essential economic assistance, and limited
military cooperation.” 109 While relations have not been
emerged as the successor to Kim Jong-il.”); North Korea’s Kim Jong Un Wages Defector
Crackdown, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 2012, 4:00 AM, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
world_now/2012/01/kim-jong-il-death-new-north-korean-leader-kim-jong-uncrackdown-on-defectors.html (claiming that Kim Jong-un has instructed North Korean
border authorities to “shoot-to-kill” North Korean border crossers); see also Lee JongHeon, Kim Jong-Un Era Starts with New Landmines on China Border and Shoot-to-Kill Orders
to Stop Defections, WORLDTRIBUNE.COM (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.worldtribune.com/
2012/02/02/kim-jong-un-era-starts-with-new-landmines-on-china-border-and-shoot-tokill-orders-to-stop-defections; Sharp Drop in North Korea Refugees to South, INQUIRER
(Makati City), Jan. 2, 2013, 3:11 PM, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/333847/sharp-dropin-north-korea-refugees-to-south.
107. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (providing several media news
sources reporting on Kim Jong-un’s policy to “shoot-to-kill” North Koreans at North
Korean borders); see also Philip Bump, Satellites Show North Korea’s Prison Camps
WIRE
(Feb.
26,
2013),
Expanding
Under
Kim
Jong-Un,
ATLANTIC
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2013/02/north-korea-prison-campsatellites/62514/ (reporting that North Korean prison camps have grown in size and
that the number of prison guards in camps has doubled).
108. See ANDREW SCOBELL, CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: FROM COMRADES-IN-ARMS
TO ALLIES AT ARM’S LENGTH iii, 1 (2004) [hereinafter COMRADES-IN-ARMS] (noting the
Korean War in the 1950s as the start of the Peoples Republic of China-Democratic
Peoples Republic of Korea (“PRC-DPRK”) alliance and describing the relationship as
“strange” to outsiders); Alexander Zhebin, A Political History of Soviet-North Korean
Nuclear Cooperation, in THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM: SECURITY, STRATEGY
AND NEW PERSPECTIVES FROM RUSSIA 35 (James Moltz Clay et al. eds., 2011) (describing
China as North Korea’s “last major ally” and its position to North Korea as “unique”).
109 . COMRADES-IN-ARMS, supra note 108, at 4 (describing the PRC-DPRK
relationship as “one-sided”); see SAMUEL S. KIM, NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN RELATIONS IN
THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 8 (2007) (“Without a doubt, China holds greater
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consistently friendly, China has never abandoned the PRCDPRK alliance. 110 Observers rationalize the dynamic and
intimate relationship by pointing to common socialist
ideological views, logical geopolitical strategy, and the negative
implications for China if the North Korean regime were to
collapse.111
First, China and North Korea have a common, longenduring “ideological bond” through their Communist
regimes.112 Since the Korean War and through the Cold War,
China and North Korea have fought side-by-side as allies against
foreign nations they view as “common ideological enemies,”
such as the United States and South Korea.113 Second, North
Korea is an important geopolitical security interest to China.114
importance in North Korea’s foreign policy than the DPRK holds in Chinese foreign
policy.”).
110 . See RETHINKING FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: STATES, LEADERS, AND THE
BEHAVIOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 100–01 (Stephen G. Walker et al. eds., 2011)
[hereinafter RETHINKING FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS] (stating “China-North Korea
relations were at odds in the early 1990s” because of China’s newfound diplomatic
relations with South Korea, but that “strategically, China never abandoned North
Korea”); SCOTT SNYDER, CHINA’S RISE AND THE TWO KOREAS 130 (2009) (discussing
“[t]he political estrangement between China and North Korea that followed China’s
decision to normalize diplomatic relations with South Korea” in the 1990s).
111. See ALICE MILLER ET AL., BECOMING ASIA: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN ASIAN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 265 (2011) (stating that China
wants to prevent the North Korean regime from collapsing to avoid mass migration and
“a loss of North Korea as a buffer zone”); COMRADES-IN-ARMS, supra note 108, at 1
(naming shared socialist political ideology and geopolitical balance as the “logic of the
relationship between the PRC and DPRK”).
112. RUSSELL ONG, CHINA’S SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 76–77
(2007) (noting that “China and North Korea are currently among the few Communist
regimes left in the world” and share an “ideological bond . . . against the US”); see
COMRADES-IN-ARMS, supra note 108, at 1 (“As fraternal socialist party-states, Beijing and
Pyongyang share an ideological affinity.”).
113. See HANKWON KIM, CULTURAL AND STATE NATIONALISM: SOUTH KOREAN AND
JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH CHINA 137 (2007) (“Although the Korean War ended in
1953, a Cold War-regional balance of power established between the U.S.-Japan-South
Korea side and the Soviet Union-China-North Korea side.”); ONG, supra note 112, at 77
(“Both [China and North Korea] also continue to stress the common need to preserve
the ruling authoritarian parties’ hold on power by defeating the US-led strategy of
peaceful evolution . . . . [T]his strategy aims to undermine Communist regimes
through non-military means . . . .”); COMRADES-IN-ARMS, supra note 108, at 1–2
(describing China and North Korea as becoming “brothers-in-arms” starting in the
Korean War and that, in 1961, China and North Korea signed a friendship treaty “that
committed one country to come to the aid of the other if attacked).
114. See COMRADES-IN-ARMS, supra note 108, at 3 (discussing the geopolitics of the
PRC-DPRK alliance); see also NORTH KOREA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 182 (Eun Kwan
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The two Communist nations share an 850-mile border, with
North Korea serving as an important “buffer state” from US or
South Korean encroachment into China. 115 Third, China
understands that without its economic and political backing, the
North Korean regime’s survival is unlikely.116 China postulates
that a collapse of the North Korean regime may facilitate a
resurgence of the Korean War or a mass North Korean exodus
into China.117 Lastly, though PRC-DPRK relations appear to have
cooled following North Korea’s bellicose actions in 2012 and
2013, China has continued to support the State’s policies
prohibiting North Korean citizens from straying outside North
Korea’s control.118
Choi et al. eds., 2003) (stating that “China currently seems to prefer a divided Korean
Peninsula with North Korea as a buffer between South Korea and US troops”).
115. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (stating that North Korea serves as
a “buffer” zone to China preventing US and South Korean encroachment); MILLER ET
AL., supra note 111 (noting China’s concern that if it loses North Korea as a “buffer
zone” it will result in the “expansion of the American presence to China’s borders”).
116. See ROBERT G. SUTTER, CHINESE FOREIGN RELATIONS: POWER AND POLICY
SINCE THE COLD WAR 204 (“[P]revailing Chinese government actions still seemed to
strike a balance of support and accommodation of the North Korean regime, which
China seeking to avoid the many dangers for its key interests that would follow from
major instability or collapse of the North Korean regime.”); see also supra note 110 and
accompanying text (stating that China provides “crucial” political, economic, and
military support to North Korea).
117. See MELANIE KIRKPATRICK, ESCAPE FROM NORTH KOREA: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF ASIA’S UNDERGROUND RAILROAD 306 (2012) (“A collapse of North Korea would
have huge implications for China: disruption of regional trade, refugees streaming
across its border, even war.”); SUTTER, supra note 116 (“Chinese leaders showed keen
awareness that major instability in or collapse of the North Korean regime would have
potentially serious adverse consequences . . . includ[ing] the danger of full-scale war on
the Korean peninsula and large-scale refugee flows to China.”).
118. See Roberta Cohen, China’s Repatriation of North Korean Refugees, BROOKINGS
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2012/03/05-chinarepatriation-cohen (stating in a testimony submitted to the US Congressional-Executive
Commission on China that China was planning on repatriating thirty to forty North
Koreans pursuant to a bilateral agreement with North Korea); Jennifer Lind, Will China
Finally ‘Bite’ North Korea?, CNN (Mar. 14, 2013, 3:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/
03/11/opinion/lind-north-korea (discussing how China agreed to UN sanctions
against North Korea, but also why China remains an ally to North Korea); Paula
Hancocks, China Has Repatriated North Korean Defectors, South Korean Official Says, CNN
(Mar. 9, 2012, 11:39 AM) http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/09/world/asia/china-northkorea (“Ignoring international protests, China may have repatriated around 30 North
Korean defectors[,] . . . a South Korean official said Friday.”); Jane Perlez, Chinese
Editor Suspended for Article on North Korea, N.Y. Times (Apr. 1, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/world/asia/chinese-suspend-editor-whoquestioned-north-korea-alliance.html?_r =0 (reporting on a claim by Deng Yuwen, the
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1. China’s Repatriation Policy: China’s Policy of Automatically
Repatriating All North Korean Migrants
Since the 1990s, China observed a considerable influx of
North Korean migrants, primarily into the northeastern
provinces situated along the Sino-North Korean border. 119 A
large ethnic Korean population and the geographic proximity of
the provinces make for a convenient stop for the North Korean
migrants. 120 China alleges that about 10,000 North Korean
migrants reside within its borders. 121 South Korea, however,
estimates about 10,000 to 30,000 migrants are in China, while
other NGOs estimate the population to be between 100,000 and
300,000 North Korean migrants.122
author of an article published in a British paper, that the Chinese Communist Party
suspended him “after writing an article . . . saying that China should abandon its ally
North Korea”).
119. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 3 (“[T]he collapse of the North
Korean economy in the 1990s . . . provoked the greatest outpouring—starvation and
despair prompting hundreds of thousands to seek help across the [Chinese] border.”);
LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 111 (“The largest number of North Korean ‘border
crossers’ were people simply seeking to survive . . . particularly during the acute famine
in the 1990s.”); LIVES FOR SALE, supra note 23, at 11 (“In the mid-to-late 1990s, large
numbers of North Koreans began crossing into China as North Korea slipped into
famine and North Korea’s control began to fray, particularly in the northeastern
provinces bordering China.”); see also CAMMAROTA ET AL., supra note 57, at 11.
120. See LIVES FOR SALE, supra note 23, at 17, 19 (discussing the large ethnic
Korean population in China’s northeastern provinces and that “[t]he presence of
culturally similar, linguistically connected populations on the other side of the border
offers an advantage to the refugees”); see also Frank, supra note 93, at 265 (“In sum,
geographical proximity to the Sino-Korean border seems to be the dominant
explanation for the large share of migrants . . . .”); CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE,
supra note 56, at 4–6.
121. See Kyu Chang Lee, supra note 32, at 139 (“The Chinese government
estimates the number of North Korean defectors residing in China to be about
10,000.”); see also DORIS WASTL-WALTER, THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO
BORDER STUDIES 508 (2011).
122 . Compare CAREN FREEMAN, MAKING AND FAKING KINSHIP: MARRIAGE AND
LABOR MIGRATION BETWEEN CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA 98 (2011) (noting the South
Korean government’s “conservative estimate of 10,000-30,000”), and INVISIBLE EXODUS,
supra note 21, at 2 (describing South Korea’s Ministry of Unification in the Republic of
Korea’s estimate of 10,000 North Korean migrants currently in China as a low estimate
relative to non-governmental organizations’ estimates), and Kyu Chang Lee, supra note
32, at 139, with VICTOR CHA, THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE: NORTH KOREA, PAST AND FUTURE
197 (2012) (stating that other governments and organizations estimate about 100,000
to 300,000 North Korean migrants are in China), and INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21,
at 2 (noting that “as many as 300,000 [is] estimated by non-governmental groups”), and
WASTL-WALTER, supra note 121 (stating that other organizations have estimated that
about 150,000 to 300,000 North Korean migrants are within Chinese borders).
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China practices the policy of forcibly deporting all
unauthorized migrants to North Korea. 123 China justifies
repatriating the migrants under two theories. 124 First, China
claims that all North Koreans in China are “economic
migrants.”125 This sweeping classification systematically excludes
all North Korean migrants in China from the Refugee
Convention’s reach.126 Second, China asserts that it must honor
the Mutual Cooperative Protocol Between China and North
Korea for National Security and Social Order in the Border
Areas (the “Repatriation Treaty”), a PRC-DPRK bilateral
treaty.127 When it entered the 1986 agreement, China promised
to repatriate all North Korean migrants who unlawfully crossed
the Sino-North Korean border. 128 As a result of China’s
repatriation policy, North Koreans are viewed as illegal

123. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11 (explaining that
China generally denies North Koreans the opportunity to apply for political asylum and
that China maintains that it must repatriate North Korean migrants in China under the
bilateral treaty with North Korea); see also China’s Repatriation of North Korean Refugees:
Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 112th Cong. 2 (2d Sess. 2012)
[hereinafter Hearing: China’s Repatriation] (statement of Chris Smith, Chairman, Cong.Exec. Comm’n on China).
124. See Yeo Hoon Julie Park, Note, China’s “Way Out” of the North Korean Refugee
Crisis: Developing a Legal Framework for the Deportation of North Korean Migrants, 25 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 516, 521 (2011) (explaining that China’s “economic migrant”
categorization of North Korean migrants and a PRC-DPRK bilateral treaty justify its
policy to repatriate North Korean migrants); Gahng, supra note 23, at 361.
125 . See CECC ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 32 (“The Chinese
government . . . continues to deport North Korean refugees under the classification of
‘economic migrants . . . .’”); Gahng, supra note 23, at 372 (“As illegal economic
migrants, undocumented North Koreans are subject to being captured, detained, and
beaten by Chinese law enforcement.”).
126. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing China’s continued
practice of repatriating North Korean migrants); see also Greenhill, supra note 33.
127. See Repatriation Treaty, supra note 27; see also Kyu Chang Lee, supra note 32,
at 139 (explaining that in the 1960’s, China secretly entered into the Escaped Criminals
Reciprocal Extradition with North Korea, and then in 1986, it entered into the Mutual
Cooperative Protocol Between China and North Korea for National Security and Social
Order in the Border Areas, promising North Korea to repatriate all unauthorized
North Koreans); see also INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 11 n. 24.
128. See Repatriation Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 3–5, 10 (outlining China’s duties
to North Korea and demonstrating that China entered into the agreement with North
Korea in 1986); see also CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11 (“China
indicates it is obliged under a bilateral 1986 repatriation agreement with North Korea
to return all border crossers.”); INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 11; supra note 26
and accompanying text (outlining North Korean laws prohibiting the crossing of the
North Korean borders without State authorization).
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immigrants and are steadfastly denied institutional
humanitarian aid.129
Each year, China repatriates approximately 5,000 to 6,000
North Korean migrants. 130 The KINU reported that China
repatriated upwards of 15,000 migrants in June 2000 alone.131
Yet, many migrants have no desire to reside in China
permanently. 132 Many migrants use China for temporary
transitional purposes to gain entry into other countries, namely
South Korea.133
After successfully crossing Sino-North Korean borders,
North Korean migrants continue to live in perpetual fear of
repatriation.134 In addition to risks of forcible deportation, the
migrants are also susceptible to manipulation and mistreatment
by residents in China. 135 Since North Koreans in China are
129. See DICK K. NANTO ET AL., CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS 5 [hereinafter
CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS] (explaining that because China views North Korean
migrants as “economic migrants,” it does not allow UN agencies or other NGOs access
to North Korean migrants in China); CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at
9 (noting China’s “unwillingness to view illegal [North Korean] migrants as refugees”);
see also LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 113; WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION,
supra note 65, at 149.
130. See Hearing: China’s Repatriation, supra note 124, at 38 (“[I]t is estimated that
more than 5,000 refugees are deported back to North Korea every year.”); China to
Repatriate ‘Hundreds’ of N.Koreans, CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul) (Feb. 27, 2012, 12:08 PM),
http://english.chosun.com/sit e/data/ html_dir/2012/02/27/2012022701242.html.
131. KOR. INST. FOR NAT’L UNIFICATION, WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NORTH KOREA 2002, at 182 (2002); see also Kyu Chang Lee, supra note 32, at 140
(discussing the US Committee for Refugees’ finding that in June 2000, China had
repatriated 15,000 North Korean migrants).
132. YOONOK CHANG, MIGRATION EXPERIENCES OF NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES:
SURVEY EVIDENCE FROM CHINA 2 (2008) (“Relatively few refugees want to remain in
China: Most want to permanently resettle in South Korea . . . .”); see, e.g., Cha, supra
note 122, at 223 (noting that most North Korean defectors “choose to resettle in South
Korea”); Jane Kim, supra note 32, at 463.
133. YOONOK CHANG, supra note 132, at 8 (stating that most North Korean
migrants do not wish to reside in China permanently and consider their time in China
as a “‘transitional’ stay”); see also Jane Kim, supra note 32, at 463; WITNESS TO THE
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 33.
134. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 2 (“[T]he migrants remain hidden
for fear of discovery, repatriation, and harsh punishment in North Korea.”); WITNESS
TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 39 (“Approximately 67 percent identified
fear of arrest and repatriation as their biggest concern.”).
135. See WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 39 (stating that
North Korean migrants feel extreme anxiety from their lack of legal status in China);
see also Morse Tan, A State of Rightlessness: The Egregious Case of North Korea, 80 MISS. L.J.
681, 700 (2010) (noting Chinese human traffickers’ exploitation of North Korean
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compelled to remain in hiding to avoid detection, the migrants
heavily depend on lawful residents for food and shelter. 136
Human traffickers exploit this vulnerability and the majority of
North Korean women and children are sold into the Chinese
bride and sex industry.137 Studies suggest that between seventy to
over ninety percent of all North Korean women in China fall
victim to the Chinese human trafficking trade.138
2. China’s Repatriation Policy: China’s Policy of Refusing the
United Nations and NGOs Access to North Korean Migrants
Consistent with its repatriation policy, China restricts thirdparty access to North Korean migrants, a scheme predicated on

migrants in China); Gahng, supra note 23, at 367 (“[North Korean migrants] captured
by Chinese officials were often beaten and deported.”); INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note
21, at 11–15 (detailing accounts of Chinese residents exploiting or mistreating North
Korean migrants).
136 . See WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 34 (“The
overwhelming majority (88 percent) reported receiving help from the Korean-Chinese
community directly, and three-quarters reported living with Korean-Chinese.”); see also
Gahng, supra note 23, at 367 (“[Chinese] [o]fficials began actively prosecuting
unauthorized migrants and subjected them to unprecedented levels of scrutiny and
violence, forcing many to go into hiding.”); INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 11–12
(“Few refugees speak Chinese, and most rely on the assistance of ethnic Korean
residents of China.”).
137. N. Kor.: Human Rights, Refugees, and Humanitarian Challenges: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific and the Subcomm. on the Int’l Terrorism,
Nonproliferation and Human Rights of the Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th Cong. 10 (2d
Sess. 2004) [hereinafter Hearing: Human Rights, Refugees, and Humanitarian Challenges]
(statement of James A. Leach, Chairman, Subcomm. of Asia and the Pacific) (“Inside
China, North Korean women and girls are particularly vulnerable to trafficking and
sexual exploitation.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 115 (10th
ed. 2010) (“The lack of access to UNHCR assistance and constant fear of forced
repatriation by Chinese authorities leaves North Korean refugees more vulnerable to
human traffickers.”); see also Kathleen Davis, Brides, Bruises and the Border: The
Trafficking of North Korean Women into China, 26 SAIS REV. 131, 133 (“As North Korean
women migrate into China . . . they are vulnerable to being trafficked as brides or
women for the sex industry.”); LIVES FOR SALE, supra note 23, at 7 (“Although seeking
opportunities in China, they instead become victims of traffickers and victims of men in
China who paid traffickers to purchase a North Korean ‘wife.’”).
138. Hearing: Human Rights, Refugees, and Humanitarian Challenges, supra note 137,
at 76 (statement of Timothy A. Peters, Founder & Dir., Helping Hands/Kor.); see also
Kim, supra note 32 (noting that seventy to eighty percent of North Korean women in
China are trafficked); Tan, supra note 135 (stating that seventy to ninety percent of
North Korean women in China become a victim to the Chinese trafficking trade).
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the illegal migrant status of the North Koreans in China.139 At
the local level, assisting North Korean migrants is unlawful in
China.140 Residents discovered aiding or harboring the migrants
risk persecution for violating Chinese law.141 With respect to the
global community, China routinely bars UN agencies, NGOs,
and other institutions from monitoring North Korean
migrants. 142 The restrictive regulations prevent the United
Nations from aiding migrants or screening North Koreans in
China to determine their refugee status under international
law.143
Initially, China permitted the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (the “UNHCR”) to establish a full Branch Office in
Beijing in 1995.144 During this time, while most of the individuals
seeking the UNHCR’s aid were Vietnamese migrants, the
139. See CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS, supra note 129 (discussing China’s view
of North Korean migrants as “economic migrants” rather than “political refugees,” and
therefore does not allow UN agencies or other non-governmental organizations access
to North Korean migrants in China); WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65,
at 149 (explaining that China does not consider North Korean migrants as “refugees”
under the Refugee Convention and how China’s steadfast refusal to view the migrants
as refugees “has blocked an appropriate international response through the
UNHCR”).
140. See Ahn, supra note 28, at 311–12 (noting a Chinese law that “[prohibits] the
harboring of undocumented migrants”); Carrinski, supra note 23, at 660; Leo, supra
note 28 (“The government also reportedly arrested individuals who organized food,
shelter, transportation, and other assistance to North Koreans.”)
141. See Ahn, supra note 28, at 312 (detailing a claim in the US Federal Courts of
Appeal by an individual who was persecuted by the Chinese government for harboring
North Korean migrants in China); Carrinski, supra note 23, at 660; Leo, supra note 28
(discussing the Chinese government’s actions against those discovered to have
provided aid to North Korean migrants).
142. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (explaining how China does not
permit third party organizations to aid North Korean migrants in China).
143. See Carrinski, supra note 23, at 663 (“As of yet, China has not allowed the
UNHCR to screen North Koreans for refugee status around the border region where
most North Koreans live, despite UNHCR requests and pressure to do so.”); see also
Ahn, supra note 28; Leo, supra note 28.
144. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11 (explaining that in
1995, China permitted the UNHCR to open a full Branch Office in Beijing). For the
agreement the UNHCR attempted to enter into with China to have full, unimpeded
access to all migrants in China seeking asylum, see Key Provisions of 1995 Treaty Between
China and the UNHCR, LIFE FUNDS FOR NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES,
http://www.northkoreanrefugees.com/unhcr-keyprovisions.html (last visited Nov. 28,
2012) [hereinafter Key Provisions of 1995 Treaty]; see also About Us, UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html (last visited, Nov. 21) (providing a
description of the UNHCR and its duties).
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UNHCR managed to screen some North Korean migrants.145
China soon discovered that the UNHCR had interviewed North
Koreans and that the agency had determined that the migrants
were refugees under international refugee law. 146 Seeing the
North Korean migrant problem as an internal matter, China
vehemently opposed the UNHCR’s actions.147 Thereafter, China
denied the UNHCR any further access to North Koreans.148
Although China had once welcomed the UNHCR’s presence,
the UNHCR now has “virtually no direct access” to North
Koreans in China.149 Despite the UNHCR’s declaration in 2003
that all North Korean defectors were “persons of concern,” it
has had little success in changing current conditions.150
China also actively thwarts the efforts of North Koreans to
request refuge at foreign embassy compounds in China.151 In
145. See JAMES D. SEYMOUR, CHINA: BACKGROUND PAPER ON THE SITUATION OF
NORTH KOREANS IN CHINA 19–20 (2005) (“[In 1995], any refugee issues were
comparatively minor, involving limited numbers of people mainly from Vietnam.”);
CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11 (stating that the UNHCR had
screened North Korean migrants in China and determined that they were refugees
under the Refugee Convention); see also Cha, supra note 122, at 198.
146. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 10–11 (stating that
China discovered the UNHCR had screened North Korean migrants and determined
that they were refugees); SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 20.
147. See SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 20; see also CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE,
supra note 56, at 10–11 (stating that China saw the North Korean migrant problem as
an internal matter”).
148. See SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 19 (“[The UNHCR] is now seen as meddling
in what China would prefer to keep as an internal or bilateral matter.”); see also CRS
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11.
149. See SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 20; see also CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE,
supra note 56, at 11 (explaining that after China’s discovery that the UNHCR had
screened North Korean migrants, it prohibited the UNHCR’s direct access to the
migrants thereafter).
150 . See CONGR.-EXEC. COMM’N ON ON CHINA, 2005 ANNUAL REP.: NORTH
KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA, 109TH CONG. 6 (1st Sess. 2005) [hereinafter CECC
ANNUAL REPORT 2005] (finding that a “compelling case exists for recognizing North
Koreans in China as refugees”); Hearing: China’s Repatriation, supra note 123, at 51
(statement of Roberta Cohen, Non-resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Inst.) (“To
UNHCR since 2004, North Koreans in China without permission are deemed ‘persons
of concern,’ meriting humanitarian protection.”).
151. See Benjamin Neaderland, Note, Quandary on the Yalu: International Law,
Politics, and China’s North Korean Refugee Crisis, 40 STANFORD INT’L L.J. 143, 150 (2004)
(detailing the Chinese government’s usage of barbed wires around embassy
compounds and policemen actively checking for North Korean migrants in
surrounding embassy areas to prevent the migrants from reaching the embassies);
Carrinski, supra note 23, at 663 (stating that many North Korean migrants who have
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2002, twenty-five North Korean migrants reached the Spanish
Embassy in China and successfully negotiated their transfer to
South Korea.152 Soon after, several more North Korean migrants
began to rush towards unguarded embassy gates. 153 China
reacted by heavily fortifying the surrounding areas of the
embassies with policemen and barbed wire.154 At present, North
Korean migrants apprehended at embassy gates are “dragged
out of embassy compounds and repatriated to North Korea.”155
II. CHINA’S REPATRIATION POLICY: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND EXAMINING CONFLICTING PRC-UN AND PRC-DPRK
TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Part II analyzes China’s incompatible obligations to the
United Nations and to North Korea. First, Part II.A introduces
the UN treaties and Chinese domestic law governing the rights
of refugees and migrants at risk of subjection to torture if
deported. Part II.B then explores the definitions of a “refugee,”
“economic migrant,” and “refugee sur place” under
international law. Lastly, Part II.C examines China’s conflicting
treaty obligations and the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Part
II.C also considers the last-in-time rule, a procedural custom in
reached embassy compounds have been “caught and dragged out” and subsequently
repatriated).
152. Neaderland, supra note 151, at 150–51 (discussing the successful defection of
the twenty-five North Korean migrants from China and the subsequent events following
the event); see also North Koreans storm Spanish embassy, CNN World (Mar. 14, 2002,
8:35 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-03-14/world/nkorea.spain.china.2130_1_
point-of-such-desperation-north-korean-refugees-spanish-embassy?_s=PM:asiapcf.
153. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing the attempts of North
Korean migrants to reach embassy compounds after the successful transfer of twentyfive North Koreans to South Korea).
154 . See Down to the Wire, THE ECONOMIST (London)(May 16, 2002),
http://www.economist.com/node/1135535 (“The [Chinese] authorities have lately
been scrambling to throw up barbed wire and other unsightly barriers around
diplomatic installations, in order to slow the rising tide of North Koreans seeking
political asylum by hopping fences and dashing through gates to foreign missions.”);
INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 30; Neaderland, supra note 151, at 150.
155. See Japan-China Spat Over North Koreans, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORP. (May
9, 2002, 8:19 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/197 6702.stm (reporting
on an incident when China “forcibly removed two North Korean asylum seekers from a
Japanese consulate in north-east China”); Mike Kim, supra note 58, at 110 (describing
the story of a sixteen year old North Korea migrant and nine other North Koreans who
attempted to reach a foreign embassy in China but were caught and repatriated to
North Korea); see also Carrinski, supra note 23, at 663.
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international law, and the effect on human rights treaties when
enforcing the rule.
A. The Refugee Convention, the CAT, and China’s Extradition Law:
The Prohibition on the Refouleing of Refugees and Migrants Likely to
be Subjected to Torture
Cognizant of the millions of displaced individuals outside
their home countries, the United Nations brought into force the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol (collectively the “Refugee Convention”), an
international agreement regulating the legal rights of
refugees. 156 Through proffering its signature in 1982, China
agreed to protect refugees within its borders.157 North Korea,
however, is not a signatory.158
Under the Refugee Convention, a “refugee” is “any person
who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality.”159 Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits
contracting nations from repatriating, or the refouleing of,
refugees inside their borders.160 This key non-refouler provision
states, “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’)
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
156. See generally 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29; Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, art. 1
(removing temporal and geographical limitations initially set in the 1951 Refugee
Convention); UNHCR, THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 1 (2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ec262df9.html
(explaining that the 1951 Refugee Convention’s purpose was to protect the millions of
refugees after World War I and World War II forced to resettle as a result of World War
II, later amended and broadened by its 1967 Protocol).
157. See U.N. Treaty Collection 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29 (naming
China among one of the contracting parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention); U.N.
Treaty Collection 1967 Protocol, supra note 29 (naming China as one of the signatories
to the 1967 Protocol).
158. See U.N. Treaty Collection 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29 (listing
the contracting parties to the Refugee Convention); UN Treaty Collection 1967
Protocol, supra note 29 (showing that North Korea is not a signatory to the 1967
Protocol).
159. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 1.
160 . See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 33 (prohibiting the
repatriation of refugees).
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account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.”161
In 1984, the United Nations adopted the Refugee
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 162 The CAT mandates
member nations to protect individuals who are likely to be
subjected to torture in a particular country. 163 While North
Korea is not a party to the CAT, China entered into the treaty in
1986 and ratified it in 1988.164
Like the Refugee Convention, Article 3 of the CAT contains
a non-refouler clause, prohibiting member nations from
refouleing persons “where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.”165 The CAT defines “torture” as follows:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.166

161. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 33.
162. CAT, supra note 36.
163. See CAT, supra note 36 (prohibiting parties to the CAT from repatriating
individuals, not limited to individuals with refugee status under the Refugee
Convention, who are likely to face torture or inhuman treatment upon return to his or
her home country); see also Richard P. Shafer, Construction and Application of United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, or
Punishment, 184 A.L.R. FED. 385, 385 (2003) (“[The CAT] was enacted in order to
make more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world.”).
164. See Status Table of Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited
Apr. 21, 2012) [hereinafter U.N. Treaty Collection CAT] (listing the state parties to the
CAT).
165. CAT, supra note 36, art. 3.
166. CAT, supra note 36, art. 1.
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To qualify as “torture,” the CAT requires four basic
elements: (1) physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) suffered
by a person; (3) by or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official; and (4) with the intent to inflict the pain or
suffering for the listed purposes.167
Domestically, China adopted language akin to the CAT in
its Extradition Law of the People’s Republic of China (the
“Extradition Law”).168 Article 8 of the Extradition Law, enacted
in 2000, prohibits the extradition of persons who “[have] been
or will probably be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman
or humiliating treatment or punishment.”169 In China’s periodic
report to the United Nations’ Committee Against Torture,
China affirmed that Article 8 “in essence transfer[red] the
provisions in Article 3 of the [CAT] into domestic legal
requirements, and [has] an important significance in respect of
preventing subjects of extradition requests from being
tortured.” 170 As follows, China must reject any requests for
extradition if the individual will likely be subjected to torture in
the requesting country.171
B. The Refugee Convention: Legally Identifying North Korean
Migrants
To date, the Refugee Convention is the only universally
binding instrument that affords protection to refugees. 172
167. See id.; see also Kyu Chang Lee, supra note 32, at 149 (listing the elements of
the CAT).
168. See PRC Extradition Law, supra note 36 for the text of China’s Extradition
Law; see also U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reps. Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Fourth Periodic Reps. of States Parties Due
in 2004: China, pt. I, art. 2, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CHN/4 (June 27, 2007)
[hereinafter U.N. CAT Report] (stating that the language in Article 8 in the
Extradition Law was taken from Article 3 of the CAT).
169. PRC Extradition Law, supra note 36, para 7.
170. U.N. CAT Report, supra note 168.
171. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text for the text of and a
discussion on Article 8 of China’s Extradition Law.
172. See UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status: Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, at 1, HCR/1P/ENG/REV. 3 (Dec. 2011)
[hereinafter UNHCR Handbook] (stating in the UNHCR’s Handbook and Guidelines
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, or the “UNHCR
Handbook,” that “the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol are ‘the central
instruments underpinning the international refugee protection regime for sixty
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Stipulated in the non-refoulement clause in Article 33, all
contracting nations are prohibited from repatriating refugees.173
Citing to the Refugee Convention, some critics question the
legality of China’s treatment of North Korean migrants. 174
Nonetheless, China argues that the migrants are not “refugees”
as defined in the Refugee Convention, but rather are “economic
migrants.”175 Thus, China maintains that its repatriation policy is
not in contravention of international law.176
1. “Economic Migrants” or “Refugees?”
The UNHCR’s Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (the “UNHCR
Handbook”) defines an “economic migrant” as one who “is
moved exclusively by economic considerations.”177 According to
the UNHCR, “[economic migrants] choose to move in order to
years’”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING: A FIELD MISSION MANUAL 432 (Anette
Faye Jacobsen ed., 2008) (describing the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967
Protocol as “the most important international sources related to refugee protection”);
DORIS M. MEISSNER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION CHALLENGES IN A NEW ERA: A
REP. TO THE TRILATERAL COMM’N 91 (1993) (explaining that the 1951 Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol are “the only legally binding international
instruments governing migration matters”); Erika Feller, The Evolution of the
International Refugee Protection Regime, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129, 131 (2001) (“The
1951 Convention was the first, and indeed remains the only, binding refugee
protection instrument of a universal character.”).
173. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 33 (non-refoulement
provision).
174. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DENIED STATUS, DENIED EDUCATION: CHILDREN
OF NORTH KOREAN WOMEN IN CHINA 3 (2008) (arguing that China’s policy to
repatriate all North Korean migrants is a violation of both domestic and international
law); see also GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 32, para. 199 (listing China’s possible
violations of international law with regard to its treatment of North Korean migrants).
175. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 10 (explaining that
China views North Korean migrants as economic migrants, as opposed to political
refugees); see also CECC ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 32, at 127.
176. See Joel R. Charny, North Koreans in China: A Human Rights Analysis, 13 INT’L
J. KOREAN UNIFICATION STUD. 75, 81 (2004) (“In addition to insisting that all North
Koreans are economic migrants, China also justifies its treatment of North Koreans by
citing sovereign treaties with the DPRK . . . .”); supra note 175 and accompanying text
(discussing China’s use of the “economic migrant” label to justify its repatriation policy
with regards to North Korean migrants).
177. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 172, at 15. The UNHCR Handbook provides
the guidelines to assist in the interpretation of the Refugee Convention. Id. at 1. See
Brush, supra note 23, at 39 (noting that the UNHCR provides that “economic
migrants” differ from “refugees” in that they are outside their home countries for
purely economic reasons); Gahng, supra note 23, at 372.
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improve the future prospects of themselves” whereas “refugees”
are forced “to move if they are to save their lives or preserve
their freedom.”178 As evidenced in a KINU study and interviews
conducted by Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) and the HRNK,
China is correct in that some North Koreans migrate to China
seeking only economic opportunity. 179 Still, North Korean
migrants cross the Sino-North Korean border for non-economic
reasons, as well.180 The HRW and HRNK interviews revealed that
some fled due to political persecution and loss of class status.181
North Korean gulag expert, David Hawk, demonstrates in a
HRNK in-depth study on North Korean prison camps, The
Hidden Gulag: The Lives and Voices of “Those Who are Sent to the
Mountains (“The Lives and Voices”), the reasons migrants flee

178 . Refugees, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c125.html (last
visited Apr. 21, 2013).
179. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 23, at 9–10 (discussing North Korean
migrants’ decisions to flee North Korea); KINU WHITE PAPER 2005, supra note 53, at
334 (providing a table showing that, as of June 2004, about fifty-five percent out of
4,075 North Koreans in China defected to China for economic reasons); LIVES AND
VOICES, supra note 1, at 111; see also Stephan Haggard et al., Markets and Famine in North
Korea, 3 GLOBAL ASIA 32, 36 (2008) (“As circumstances deteriorate [for North
Koreans], the incentives to move into China rise . . . in search of business opportunities
and food.”).
180. See Yoonok Chang, supra note 132, at 1 (“Chronic food shortages, political
repression, and poverty have drive tens of thousands of North Koreans into China.”);
Jane Kim, supra note 32, at 457 (pointing out that two-thirds of North Korean migrants
in China are women and leave North Korea because of discrimination grounded on
gender, class, and political opinion); Kyu Chang Lee, supra note 32, at 145–46
(discussing the difficulty in defining all North Korean migrants in China as “economic
migrants” due to the fact that some North Korean migrants are actually fleeing from
fear of persecution for political opinion, religious beliefs, or membership in a social
group).
181. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 9–12 (providing the interviews
conducted by Human Rights Watch, or “HRW,” of North Korean migrants in China
and the reasons why they crossed North Korean borders for China); see generally LIVES
AND VOICES, supra note 1 (providing a detailed report published by the HRNK on the
interviews of North Korean migrants); see also Phil Robertson, Deputy Dir., Asia
Division, Human Rights Watch at the 2d KINU Chaillot Human Rights Forum 2012:
The Problem of North Korean Refugees in China and Possible Solutions (June 14,
2012) (reporting that HRW had interviewed over sixty North Koreans who had fled
North Korea in 2010 to 2011 and found being “among the ‘wavering’ classes or even
‘hostile’ class, and fac[ing] discrimination, harassment, arrest, and imprisonment for a
wide variety of so-called crimes that involve legitimate rights and activities” as some
motives for crossing North Korean borders); Jeffries, supra note 58, at 101 (stating that
150,000 to 200,000 political prisoners and their families are detained in one of North
Korea’s prison camps); Mike Kim, supra note 58.
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North Korea.182 A significant portion of North Korean migrants
interviewed for the report indicated that they defected due to
fears of persecution grounded on perceived political dissent
against the State.183 Several migrants revealed that they were
persecuted for the defections of their relatives, expressing
political dissent, and listening to South Korean music.184
For example, North Korean migrant Lee Young-kuk’s
testimony illustrates the experience of a North Korean migrant
who defected to China to flee political persecution.185 In The
Lives and Voices, David Hawk explains that Lee Young-kuk was
Kim Jong-il’s former bodyguard who was punished for voicing
political opinions that aligned with South Korean democratic
views.186 Lee’s testimony disclosed, “[i]n 1994, Lee fled to China
hoping to defect to South Korea. However, he was discovered
missing, and because of his personal association with the ‘Dear
Leader,’ North Korean security agents chased after him” and
arrested him in Beijing.187 Lee was ultimately imprisoned in a
North Korean detention center and brutally punished for
fleeing the nation, noting that “[w]hile in Beijing, [Lee] had
freely expressed unfavorable opinions about the regime.” 188
Thus, in examining these HRW and HRNK interviews, the
UNHCR and various organizations have determined that at least
some North Koreans in China are qualified refugees under the
Refugee Convention.189
182. See generally Lives and Voices, supra note 1, for interviews of North Korean
migrants conducted by David Hawk and his team and published by the NGO, HRNK.
183. Id. at 51–109 (providing testimonies of former North Korean political penal
camp detainees who successfully fled North Korea after facing severe political
persecution by the North Korean regime).
184. See id. at 54, 60–62, 100 (providing the testimonies of North Korean migrants
Kim Young-sun, Kang Chol-hwan, Lee Young-kuk Lee, and Ji Hae-nam as examples of
migrants who fear political persecution by the North Korean government).
185. Id. at 61–62 (providing Lee Young-kuk’s interview conducted by David
Hawk).
186. Id. at 61 (stating “[Lee] became a bodyguard to Kim Jong-il . . . [and] soon
he became disillusioned by the political indoctrination he had been taught”).
187. Id. at 61–62 (describing Lee Young-kuk’s first failed attempt at defection).
188. Id. at 62 (stating that Lee had honestly confessed his opinions about the
North Korean regime while he was in Beijing and providing Lee’s belief that his
“torture was solely intended as punishment for having fled to China”).
189. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 10–11 (noting the
UNHCR’s determination that some of the North Korean migrants in China it had
interviewed were refugees); see also Hearing: China’s Repatriation, supra note 123
(statement of Roberta Cohen, Non-resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Inst.) (stating
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2. “Refugees sur place”
The Refugee Convention recognizes that individuals may
qualify as refugees from circumstances that arise both before
and after emigration from their home country.190 An individual
who assumes refugee status from ensuing events following his
departure is a refugee sur place. 191 The UNHCR Handbook
elucidates, “[a] person may become a refugee ‘sur place’ as a
result of his own actions, such as associating with refugees
already recognized, or expressing his political views in his
country of residence.”192
For example, where a North Korean migrant comes into
contact with a South Korean citizen or religious organization
while in China, he risks conviction in North Korea for
committing a political offense.193 Former prison camp inmate
testimonies evince that repatriated North Koreans are
persecuted for the presumed political acts against the North
Korean regime and face punishment upon their return.194 In
one HRNK report, Hawk argues, “[m]any more, indeed almost
all, North Koreans who flee to China fall within the definition of
refugees sur place . . . because of the severe persecution [North

that in 2004, UNHCR declared that North Koreans in China were “persons of
concern,” warranting humanitarian aid); CECC ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note 150
(finding that a “compelling cases exists for recognizing North Koreans in China as
refugees”).
190. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 172, at 19 (“A person who was not a refugee
when he left his country, but who becomes a refugee at a later date, is called a refugee
‘sur place.’”); see also Refugees and Asylees; Temporary Protected Status, IMMIGRATION LAW
SERVICE, §10:169 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter REFUGEES & ASYLEES] (explaining that an
individual who does not qualify as a refugee at the time of departure from his home
country may still qualify as a refugee if the individual “subsequently qualifies as [a
refugee] because of intervening circumstances”).
191. See supra text accompanying note 191 (defining “refugees sur place”).
192 . See supra note 190 and accompanying text (providing the UNHCR
Handbook’s definition of “refugees sur place”).
193. See supra notes 66, 70 and accompanying text (explaining the consequences
for repatriated North Korean migrants found to have come into contact with South
Koreans, South Korean culture, or religious organizations).
194. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 19 (contending that some North
Koreans in China qualify as refugees sur place); see supra notes 66, 779 and
accompanying text (describing the treatment of North Korean migrants convicted of
political offenses).
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Korean migrants will face], as the testimonies . . . indicate, if
returned to North Korea against their will.”195
C. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Governing China’s
Conflicting Treaty Obligations
China contends that the PRC-DPRK bilateral treaty
preempts construing its repatriation policy as a violation of
international law.196 Indeed, China’s argument carries weight.197
An international legal norm and fundamental dictum in treaty
law is pacta sunt servanda—nations must fulfill their treaty
obligations in good faith.198 The principle, as codified in Article
26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”),
provides, “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith.”199
At the 24th Committee Against Torture session in May
2000, Mr. Zonghuai Qiao, a member of the Chinese delegation,
stated, “China adhered to the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
Under the Chinese legal system, the international
instruments . . . were considered part of Chinese law and legally
binding. In the event of conflict between an international
195. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 115 (providing David Hawk’s belief that
most, if not all, North Korean migrants are refugees sur place).
196. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11 (explaining that
China claims that it is obligated to repatriate North Korean migrants “under a bilateral
1986 agreement with North Korea”); SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 12 (“China’s position
is that . . . its first obligation is to uphold its bilateral agreements with North Korea
regarding the expulsion of migrants.”); see also Gahng, supra note 23, at 370 (“[China]
asserts that its bilateral treaty with North Korea trumps any obligations under the
Refugee and the 1967 Protocol.”).
197 . See Neaderland, supra note 151, at 156–57 (contending that China’s
justification that it must honor its bilateral treaty commitments to North Korea is “not
without merit in international law”); see also Carrinski, supra note 23, at 650.
198. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, July 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] for the text of pacta sunt servanda as codified in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”); see also Rep. of the Int’l Law
Comm’n on the work of its 18th Sess., May 4–July 19, 1966, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1,
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 211 (1966) (“Pacta sunt servanda . . . is the
fundamental principle of the law of treaties.”); Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda
and State Promises to Foreign Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality,
32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550, 1592 (2009).
199. VCLT, supra note 198; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N.
Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Nov. 12, 2012,
7:40PM) (showing China as a party to the treaty).
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instrument and a domestic law, the provisions of the
international instrument took precedence.” 200 The US
Congressional-Executive Commission on China argues that this
statement contradicts China’s practice of forcibly deporting
North Korean migrants. 201 But, to the extent that the
Repatriation Treaty is a PRC-DPRK international instrument,
China’s position is not without merit.202 Under the aegis of pacta
sunt servanda, China must honor its obligations to North Korea
in good faith.203
1. The Last-in-time Rule and Article 30 of the VCLT
Another prominent maxim in treaty law is lex posterior
derogat priori, more commonly known as the last-in-time rule,
which addresses incongruent treaty obligations involving the
same state parties. 204 Under the last-in-time rule, the
incompatible provisions of the treaty signed last in time are
given force. 205 Framed in the VCLT, Article 30(3) provides,
“[when] all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the

200. Comm. Against Torture Meeting, Geneva, Switz., May 12, 2000, Summary
Record of the 419th Meeting: China, Poland, CAT/C/SR.419 (May 12, 2000).
201. See Kim Sang Hun, Remarks before the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, Apr. 19, 2004, available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/041904/
kim.php (“The Chinese government indisputably contradicts itself when it arbitrarily
applies its national law to a clearly international issue . . . . The Chinese government is
clearly obliged to justify its decision against the granting of refugee status to North
Koreans by its declaration of Chinese national law as justification for the repatriation of
North Korean defectors.”); see also The Plight of North Koreans in China: A Current
Assessment: Roundtable before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 108th Cong.,
2d. Sess., 37 (Apr. 19, 2004).
202. See Neaderland, supra, note 151, at 156–57; see also Carrinski, supra note 23, at
650 (recognizing that China’s repatriation policy “arguably retain[s] merit in
international law under the principle of pacta sunt servanta”).
203 . See Neaderland, supra note 151, at 156–57 (contending that China’s
arguments with regards to its obligations to the PRC-DPRK treaty may be meritorious).
204 . See R. DOAK BISHOP, ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 346 (2005) (noting that lex posterior derogat priori is a
“widely recognized principle of treaty construction”); Julie M. Grimes, Conflicts Between
EC Law and International Treaty Obligations: A Case Study of the German Telecommunications
Dispute, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 535, 559 (1994) (stating that lex posterior derogat priori is an
“important principle of treaty law”); see also Rijie Ernie Gao, Note, Between a Rock and a
Hard Place: Tensions Between the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement and the Duty to Ensure
Individual Rights Under the ICCPR, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 585, 623–624 (2010).
205. VCLT, supra note 198, art. 30(3).
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later treaty . . . the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that
its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.”206
Article 30(4) states that when a conflict arises between a
posterior bilateral treaty and an older multilateral treaty to
which both nations are parties, the last-in-time rule still
applies.207 Where the concerned nations are not parties to both
treaties, then the treaty to which all of the affected nations are
parties will govern.208 That is, if China is a state party to both
Treaty A and Treaty B, but North Korea is only a state party to
Treaty B, the incompatible provisions of Treaty B would be
enforced.209 Article 30(5) concludes, “Paragraph 4 is without
prejudice to . . . any question of responsibility which may arise
for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty the
provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards
another State under another treaty.”210 Curiously, by reason of
accountability, the fifth clause impliedly gives nations the choice
to enforce the provisions of either treaty.211

206 . Id.; see Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. established by General Assembly
resolution 51/210 of 17 Dec. 1996, 5th Sess., Feb. 12–23, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/37,
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 37, at 14 (March 27, 2001) (“[T]he ‘last in time’ rule, as
expounded in article 30 of the [VCLT] . . . would apply and thereby the comprehensive
convention . . . would supersede previous conventions to the extent that it overlapped
in substance with such conventions . . . .”).
207. VCLT, supra note 198, art. 30(4)(a) (providing that when there are different
parties to two treaties, “the same rule applies as in paragraph 3” as between states that
are parties to both).
208. VCLT, supra note 199, art. 30(4)(b) (stating that when the parties to a later
treaty are not the same to the earlier one, “as between a State party to both treaties and
a State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties
governs their mutual rights and obligations”).
209. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (providing the applicable text of
Article 30(4)).
210. VCLT, supra note 199, at art. 30(5).
211. See INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SOFT LAW 12–13 (Andrea K.
Bjorklund et al. eds., 2012) (“[Article 30] leaves the latter party with the choice
regarding which treaty to honor and which to breach, and as hinted in 30(5), this party
is likely to incur international responsibility vis-á-vis the injured party.”); THE LAW OF
TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 188 (Enzo Cannizaro ed. 2011)
[hereinafter LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND THE VCLT] (explaining that Article 30(5) of the
VCLT essentially provides nations the choice to “execute one [treaty], violating the
other” without considering the last-in-time rule). “Practice generally points in this
direction: suffice it to mention the case law of the Commission and the European
Court of Human Rights, which have always refused to justify failure to comply with the
European Convention on Human Rights by states claiming that the violations they
committed arose from their commitment to earlier treaties.”).
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2. Applying the Last-in-time Rule and Article 30 of the VCLT to
Resolve Conflicts Involving Multilateral Human Rights Treaties
Application of the last-in-time rule becomes particularly
problematic when a conflicting treaty’s objective is to inculcate
fundamental human rights and values.212 Often, a treaty signed
last-in-time overrides the provisions of a preceding international
treaty affording or protecting an individual’s fundamental
freedoms.213 Employing the rule then vitiates the essence of the
human rights treaty.214 For this reason, the last-in-time-rule has
been recognized as a significant burden for international
human rights treaties, specifically the Refugee Convention.215
Scholars argue that the rule allows governments to effectively
renege on anterior treaty commitments by enacting legislation
or entering into new agreements.216
In contemplating these conflicts, several nations have
carved out exceptions to the last-in-time rule to avoid
invalidating critical provisions in human rights treaties.217 In the
212. Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and
International Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J.
INT’L L. 393, 394-97 (1988) [hereinafter Rediscovering the Relationship] (discussing
exceptions to the last in time rule that protect fundamental human rights offered by
international treaties); Gao, supra note 205, at 624 (“A simple last-in-time rule,
moreover, produces particularly unsatisfactory results with human rights treaties; such
treaties represent fundamental norms that privilege the rights of the individual has
human beings.”); see 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 30, pmbl. (affirming “the
principle that human beings shall enjoy the fundamental rights and freedoms without
discrimination”); CAT, supra note 37, pmbl. (providing that the purpose of the CAT is
to consider “the obligation of States under the Charter . . . to promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms”).
213. See Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117, 117
(2001) (providing a “fearsome example of the consequences of Congress’ ability to
abrogate international human rights norms” through the last-in-time rule); Gao, supra
note 204, at 624 (discussing how the last-in-time rule can impede on fundamental
human rights of individuals when a conflicting treaty is one that protects such rights).
214. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the last-intime rule on human rights treaties).
215. See Ramji, supra note 213, at 117–18 (discussing the last-in-time rule’s effect
on the Refugee Convention).
216. See supra text accompanying note 213 (observing the last-in-time rule’s effect
on multilateral treaties).
217. See Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211, 247 (1872) (holding that “Congress has
no . . . power to settle or interfere with rights under treaties, except in cases purely
political”); Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note 212, 407–09 (noting the ‘executed
or vested’ exception to the last-in-time rule in US Supreme Court jurisprudence); see
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United States, for example, the “rights under treaties” exception
emerged to prevent the Constitution or Acts of Congress from
interfering with former treaty provisions affording individual
rights.218 As defined in the US Supreme Court case, Holden v. Joy,
under the “rights under treaties” exception, “Congress has no
constitutional power to settle or interfere with rights under
treaties, except in cases purely political.”219 Jordan Paust, a law
professor and expert in foreign relations law, explains that the
holding in Holden implies that rights conferred by treaties
“remain as rights unaffected by subsequent congressional
enactments.”220 The European Court of Human Rights applied a
similar principle when it held that the governing provision
between conflicting treaties would be that of the one preserving
an individual’s fundamental liberties.221 As North Korea is not a
state party to the Refugee Convention or to the CAT, Article
30(4) commands that the respective provisions of the
Repatriation Treaty control.222 While academics have extensively
also Robert Delson, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company: Issues of Public and Private
International Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 761 n.35 (1957) (“Problems arising under
the Human Rights Convention concerning prohibition of discrimination, minority
rights, and special rights under treaties may constitute an exception” to the general
rules about nationalizing privately-held property.”).
218. See Holden, 84 U.S. at 247 (stating that Congress does not have the authority
to interfere with rights offered by treaties unless the rights are purely political); see also
Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note 212, at 411–12; Jordan J. Paust, Responding
Lawfully to Al Qaeda, 56 CATHOLIC UNIV. L. REV. 759, 777 (2007).
219. Holden, 84 U.S. at 247; see also Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note 212, at
412 (“What this language necessarily implies is that a subsequent act of Congress
cannot ‘interfere with rights under treaties, except in cases purely political’ and, thus,
that such rights remain as rights unaffected by subsequent congressional
enactments.”).
220. Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note 212, at 412 (discussing the “rights
under treaties” exception in the US Supreme Court case, Holden v. Joy); see UH Law
Center Faculty, UNIV. OF HOUS. L. CTR., http://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/
main.asp?PID=34 (last visited Apr. 4, 2013), to learn more about international law
professor Jordan Paust.
221. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), for an
example of the European Court of Human Rights refusing to apply the last-in-time rule
when the treaty signed last in date conflicted with former treaty obligations protecting
fundamental human rights. The European Court of Human Rights held that a
conflicting treaty would not supersede a human rights treaty when it would interfere
with the protection of an individual’s fundamental human rights. Id. para. 87.
222. See VCLT, supra note 198, art. 30(4)(b) (expressing that when the parties to a
later treaty are not the same to the earlier one, “as between a State party to both
treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are
parties governs their mutual rights and obligations”); U.N. Treaty Collection 1951
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debated these issues, the reality is that the administration of the
last-in-time rule is obscured with uncertainty.223 Thus, it remains
unclear if the last-in-time rule would apply to resolve the
conflicting provisions in the Repatriation Treaty and the UN
treaties.224
3. The Last-in-time Rule’s Maxim on Resolving Inconsistencies
in Domestic Law and Treaties
Under the last-in-time rule, resolving China’s discordant
obligations to the Extradition Law and to the Repatriation
Treaty is relatively straightforward. 225 Likewise, the principle
applies to contradictions between local legislation and
international agreements. 226 The last-in-time rule may be
invoked to resolve the discrepancies in China’s obligations to its
Extradition Law and to the PRC-DPRK bilateral treaty.227 Since
the Extradition Law was enacted in 2000 and the Repatriation

Refugee Convention, supra note 30 (listing the state parties to the Refugee
Convention); U.N. Treaty Collection CAT, supra note 165 (listing the state parties to
the CAT).
223. See, e.g., supra note 211 and accompanying text (arguing that Article 30 of
the VCLT essentially gives nations the choice to enforce either treaty, regardless of
which treaty was signed last in date); see also Michael A. Namikas, Up in Smoke?: The Last
in Time Rule and Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 643, 644–45 (2008) (arguing the rule has become “outdated precedent”).
224. See VCLT, supra note 198, art. 30 (providing when the last-in-time rule must
be applied to resolve conflicts between treaties); LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND THE VCLT,
supra note 212 (“It has been said that Article 30 is neither an accurate description of
the practice nor a sure guide for those who have to solve conflicts between treaties.”);
supra notes 211, 224 and accompanying text (describing the problems in applying the
last-in-time rule); supra notes 217–21 and accompanying text (demonstrating instances
when courts have refused to apply the last-in-time rule in the context of human rights
treaties).
225. See John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of
Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1209, 1329 (2009) (discussing the last-in-time rule’s
application for conflicts between treaties and federal statutes); Jennifer Trahan, Military
Commission Trials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Do They Satisfy International and
Constitutional Law?, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 780, 819 (2007) (noting that when the
domestic law is enacted later in date “‘under the ‘last-in-time rule’ the legislation would
override inconsistent treaty obligations”).
226. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (explaining how to apply the lastin-time rule with regard to conflicting statutory and treaty provisions).
227. See supra notes 225–26 and accompanying text (discussing application of the
last-in-time rule to resolve conflicts between statutes and treaties).
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Treaty was adopted in 1986, the Extradition Law would prevail
under the last-in-time rule.228
III. PROHIBITING THE REFOULEMENT OF NORTH KOREAN
MIGRANTS IN CHINA: CHINA’S REPATRIATION POLICY
VIOLATES THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, THE CAT, AND
CHINA’S EXTRADITION LAW
Part III addresses the issues raised in Part II of this Note.
First, Part III.A argues that China’s “economic migrants”
justification is improper and therefore, the Refugee Convention
prohibits China from the automatic repatriation of all North
Korean migrants. Notwithstanding international legal
conventions, Part III.B maintains that China’s duties to the
Repatriation Treaty should not supersede its duties to the
Refugee Convention. The last-in-time rule should not apply if
the end result is the abrogation of provisions protecting
fundamental human rights. Finally, Part III.C proposes that
China implement screening procedures to provide North
Korean migrants individual assessments to determine refugee
status under the Refugee Convention.
A. The Refugee Convention: China’s “Economic Migrant” Blanket
Classification of North Korean Migrants and Practice of Automatic
Repatriation is a Breach of the Refugee Convention
The fiction of the “economic migrant” blanket
categorization is most apparent in first-hand testimonies and
interviews conducted by HRW and HRNK of North Korean
migrants in China.229 The HRW and HRNK interviews of the
migrants demonstrate that North Koreans reside in China for
multifarious reasons that are not limited to economic
opportunity. 230 As exemplified in Lee Young-kuk’s testimony,
some migrants flee North Korea as a result of their fear of
228. See PRC Extradition Law, supra note 36 (showing that China enacted the
Extradition Law in 2000); Repatriation Policy, supra note 26, art. 10 (showing that
China entered into the agreement in 1986).
229. See supra note 181 and accompanying text for the interviews conducted by
HRW and the HRNK and the varying reasons migrants flee North Korea.
230. See supra notes 179, 181, 184–85 and accompanying text (showing that the
reasons why North Korean migrants leave for China vary from economic reasons to
fleeing political and religious persecution).
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persecution for expressions of political opinion, religious belief,
and class status in North Korea.231 These studies and interviews
demonstrate that at least some North Korean migrants in China
are refugees under the Refugee Convention.232
1. Some North Korean Migrants in China Are “Refugees” as
Defined in the Refugee Convention
North Korean migrant testimonies confirm that North
Korean officials scrutinize the motives for departure to convict
repatriated migrants of political offenses. 233 This further
establishes the truth that not all North Koreans in China are
economic migrants. 234 If all North Koreans in China were
economic migrants, the interrogation and division of the
repatriated individuals would be unnecessary. 235 In such
instances, all North Korean migrants would be convicted with a

231. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 9 (documenting the interviews
conducted by HRW demonstrating that some North Korean migrants leave for China
for reasons other than economic opportunity); Robertson, supra note 181, at 2 (noting
that many North Korean migrants fled because of their political class and the
corresponding discrimination and harassment); supra notes 179, 181, 184–85 and
accompanying text (providing interviews conducted by HRW and the HRNK of former
North Korean penal camp prisoners).
232. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 20, 120 (stating that North Korean
migrants’ testimonies revealed that “virtually any encounter with South Koreans or
South Korean culture . . . is regarded as ‘an anti-state act’”); see generally, supra notes
190, 194–95 and accompanying text (showing the UNHCR Handbook’s definition of
“refugees sur place” and contentions by HRW and David Hawk that some North Korean
migrants qualify as refugees sur place).
233. See EXPOSING NORTH KOREA’S PRISON CAMPS, supra note 66, at 12 (“Fearing
transfer to a kwan-li-so or kyo-hwa-so, or even execution, repatriated North Koreans
typically deny having had any contact with South Koreans or exposure to South Korean
radio stations, television programs, movies, or music while in China.”); LIVES AND
VOICES, supra note 1, at 120 (explaining that North Korea sends repatriated migrants
who left for China only for food and employment to a different detention-interrogation
center than those who are found to have a “political component” in their offense).
234 . See supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing North Korea’s
detention system and that there are different classes of detainees).
235. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (illustrating the interrogation
techniques and detention centers dividing repatriated North Korean migrants from
China). The fact that the North Korean regime divides the detainees into groups of
those who it believes to have entered China for purely economic reasons and of those it
believes to have been in China for political reasons strongly suggests that not all the
migrants are economic migrants. See supra notes 68, 71 and accompanying text
(discussing North Korea’s extensive efforts to identify the politically-motivated migrants
and lower penalties for those migrants who were not politically motivated).
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simple non-political offense for illegal border crossing into
China and sentenced to one of the short-term prison facilities.236
Moreover, the North Korean class structure further
supports allegations by numerous North Korean migrants of
political persecution. 237 Several North Korean interviewees
admitted to fleeing for China because of their class status as a
hostile member, a status that in turn denied them specific rights
and deprived them of economic opportunities such as education
and employment.238 In addition to the UNHCR’s declaration
that some North Korean migrants are refugees under the
Refugee Convention, North Korea’s treatment of repatriated
individuals
undermines
China’s
“economic
migrant”
239
justification. Consequently, China’s blanket definition violates
international law because it falsely presumes that all North
Korean migrants are within its territory for exclusively economic
reasons.240
236 . See generally supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that
repatriated North Koreans convicted as non-political offenders have a shorter prison
sentence).
237. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text (describing the North Korean
class system and explaining that North Koreans who carry “political” taint are within
the hostile class and are deprived of certain rights).
238. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 9 (“Often, economic motivations
were intertwined with a background of political discrimination.”); see also supra note 53
and accompanying text (stating that hostile class members are denied education and
employment rights). In describing the interviews of North Korean migrants, HRW
explains,
Two different women fled to China to survive the famine . . . after each of
their families had been expelled from Pyongyang for political reasons. One
young man and his family left in 1999 because he could not enter medical
school or a teaching background because of family background. . . . An older
man, who left in 1998, sought economic help . . . [b]ut his troubles began in
1977, when his family was exiled from Pyongyang and sent to live in an
administrative camp for five years because of his father’s perceived disloyalty.
INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 9.
239. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 10 (stating that UNHCR
“believes a number [of North Korean migrants] may meet the criteria for qualifying as
refugees”); SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 20 (explaining that the UNCHR was able to
interview some North Koreans in China and determine that they were refugees); supra
note 189 and accompanying text (noting that North Korean migrants are refugees
under the Refugee Convention); supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (arguing
that some North Korean migrants in China qualify as refugees sur place).
240. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11 (“During visits to the
northeast . . . UNHCR determined that some of the newly arrived North Koreans were
refugees.”); SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 20 (observing UNHCR identified some of the
North Korean migrants it interviewed as refugees); see also Carrinski, supra note 23, at
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2. Some North Korean Migrants in China Involved in Conduct
that North Korea Presumes Are “Political Offenses” Are
Refugees Sur Place under the Refugee Convention
North Korea views contact in China with South Korean
citizens or religious organizations as manifestations of political
rebellion. 241 To the North Korean regime, these ideological
“crimes” are unlawful political expressions and warrant
persecution and incarceration.242 As expressly stated in its text,
the Refugee Convention extends protection to individuals at risk
of persecution based on religious belief or political opinion.243
Therefore, some North Korean migrants in China become
refugees as a result of their conduct after they have left their
home country.244 These North Korean migrants are qualified
refugees sur place under the Refugee Convention.245
3. North Korean Migrant Women Carrying Children of Chinese
Descent Are Refugees Sur Place, and Therefore, Are “Refugees”
under the Refugee Convention
Interviews of former North Korean prisoners also expose
North Korea’s racially motivated treatment of repatriated
663 (explaining that UNHCR “reject[ed] China’s argument that [all North Korean
migrants] were only economic migrants”); CECC ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note
150, at 113 (finding that Chinese forcible repatriation contravenes China’s obligations
under the Refugee Convention).
241 . See EXPOSING NORTH KOREA’S PRISON CAMPS, supra note 66, at 12
(explaining that contact with South Koreans or exposure to South Korean culture is
punishable by imprisonment or death); LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 120–22
(discussing the North Korean regime’s treatment of repatriated migrants it believes
were in contact with “foreign forces”); see also INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 21
(listing contact with South Koreans as one of the “aggravating factors” that warrant
harsher punishments imposed on repatriated North Koreans from China by North
Korean authorities).
242. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 120 (explaining that North Korean
migrants who have committed “anti-state” acts are sent to a political prison camp);
WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 29 (noting the different sentences
for non-political border crossing not related to South Korea).
243. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 1(A)(2) (defining refugee as a
person who flees “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”).
244. See supra notes 194–95 and text accompanying (arguing that some North
Korean migrants are refugees sur place).
245. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (contending in HRW and the
HRNK studies that some North Korean migrants are refugees sur place under the
Refugee Convention).
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women carrying children of Chinese descent.246 North Korea
executes severe disciplinary measures on pregnant women
repatriated from China and readily conducts abortions and
infanticide. 247 Due to the racially motivated gender-based
violence, these North Korean migrant women may fear
persecution for reasons of race and gender.248
The Refugee Convention’s text and the UNHCR Handbook
articulate that discrimination for reasons of race is generally a
sufficient basis for refugee protection. 249 The UNHCR
Handbook further states that, although not listed as an
enumerated fear, the Refugee Convention “covers genderrelated claims.”250 On these grounds, North Korean women in
China carrying a child of Chinese descent may qualify as
refugees sur place.251

246. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 122 (discussing racially motivated
gender-based violence in North Korean penal camps); see also Mike Kim, supra note 58,
at 112 (recounting an escapee’s recollection of a racially motivated forced abortion).
247. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 122–26 for first-hand testimonies by
former North Korean prison camp detainees; see also supra notes 87, 89 and
accompanying text (showing that North Korean prison guards often execute forced
abortions and infanticide).
248. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 1(A) (providing that
“‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reason[] of race”); UNHCR Handbook, supra note 172, at 16 (“Race, in
the present connexion, has to be understood in its widest sense to include all kinds of
ethnic groups that are referred to as ‘races’ in common usage.”); see LIVES AND VOICES,
supra note 1, at 122–26 for first-hand testimony of former detainees who suffered or
witnessed severe punishment for carrying a child with a Chinese father; see also Mike
Kim, supra note 59, at 112 for a former North Korean prisoner’s recollection of a guard
who kicked a pregnant repatriated migrant’s stomach when she admitted that she was
carrying a Chinese man’s baby.
249. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 1(A)(2) (expressing race as
one of the qualifying reasons for protection under the Refugee Convention); see also
UNHCR Handbook, supra note 172, at 16 (“Discrimination for reasons of race has
found world-wide condemnation as one of the most striking violations of human
rights . . . [and] therefore, represents an important element in determining the
existence of persecution.”).
250. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 172, at 81.
251. See UNHCR Handbook, supra note 172, at 16, 19 (defining “refugees sur
place” and explaining that persecution for reasons of race is a common basis for
protection under the Refugee Convention); see also supra notes 194–95 and
accompanying text (arguing that some North Korean migrants are refugees sur place
due to the high levels of violence in prison camps).
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B. The Last-in-time Rule: The Primacy of Human Rights Treaties
Should Trump International Procedural Norms
Notwithstanding the last-in-time rule and Article 30 of the
VCLT, the Repatriation Treaty should not override conflicting
provisions in the Refugee Convention or the CAT. The United
States’ “rights under treaties” exception and the ECHR’s
holding demonstrate an awareness that the last-in-time rule
renders human rights treaties, such as the Refugee Convention,
ineffective.252 Applying the last-in-time rule to resolve conflicts
with international human rights treaties allows governments to
nullify key provisions of the multilateral treaties through
legislation or posterior agreements.253 Particularly because the
Refugee Convention is the only universally binding instrument
protecting refugees, a procedural norm should not be used to
resolve the inconsistencies between the Repatriation Treaty and
the Refugee Convention.254 Such action would result in denying
North Korean migrants in China the protection of their
fundamental human rights.255
Even if the last-in-time rule is applied to reconcile PRC-UN
and PRC-DPRK treaty conflicts, international law still precludes
China from automatically repatriating all North Korean
migrants.256 The Extradition Law forbids China from deporting
individuals to nations where there are sufficient grounds to

252. See supra notes 219–21 and text accompanying (discussing the “rights-undertreaties” exception); see also Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7,
13 (1989) (holding that provisions of the bilateral treaty would not supersede the
conflicting provisions of the multilateral treaty if it would impede on the individual’s
fundamental human rights).
253. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing that under the last-intime rule, governments have the ability to legislate over their obligations to multilateral
human rights treaties).
254. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the
Refugee Convention as the only binding agreement between nations protecting
refugees); see also Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note 212 at 410–14 (explaining
that the “rights-under-treaties” exception to the last-in-time rule was created so that
subsequent treaties or legislations would not supersede individuals’ rights); Gao, supra
note 204, at 624; Ramji, supra note 213.
255. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (noting the problems of applying
the last-in-time rule with human rights treaties).
256. See supra text accompanying note 226 (explaining that the last-in-time rule is
applied to resolve conflicting obligations between statutes and treaties, as well).
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believe that they will be subjected to torture.257 While China’s
Extradition Law does not define “torture,” a report to the
United Nations submitted by China noted that the language of
Article 8 of China’s Extradition Law tracks Article 3 of the
CAT.258
To reiterate, a prima facie case for torture under the CAT
requires (1) physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) on a
person; (3) by the or with the consent or acquiescence of a state
official; and (4) with the intent and purpose of the actor.259
Certainly satisfying the first three elements in virtually all cases,
first-hand testimonies corroborate that repatriated individuals
imprisoned in North Korea penal camps suffer extreme mental
and physical pain at the hands of State prison officials.260 Prison
guards inflict pain and suffering to punish the repatriated
migrants for their criminal offenses, political offenses, and for
reasons of racial and gender discrimination, thereby meeting
the fourth element.261

257. See PRC Extradition Law, supra note 36 (prohibiting the extradition of
persons who “[have] been or will probably be subjected to torture or other cruel,
inhuman or humiliating treatment or punishment”); see also CAT, supra note 36, art. 3
(“No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.”).
258. U.N. CAT Report, supra note 168 (stating that Article 8 of the Extradition
Law essentially transferred “the provisions in Article 3 of the Convention into domestic
legal requirements, and ha[s] an important significance in respect of preventing
subjects of extradition requests from being tortured”).
259. See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text (providing the text of Article
1 of the CAT and the four elements of torture under the CAT).
260. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at ix, 33, 161 (stating that “virtually all
former prisoners’ testimonies” revealed that “there has been an extraordinarily high
rate of deaths in detention,” that almost all the former prisoners had witnessed
executions, and that “[t]orture and the cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments
experienced or witnessed by virtually all former prisoners in the DPRK forced-labor
camps are crimes against humanity”); supra text accompanying notes 79–89 (discussing
the human rights violations in North Korean prison camps); supra text accompanying
notes 66–79 (noting that repatriated North Korean migrants are sentenced to one of
the detention centers upon return); see also CAT, supra note 36, art. 1 (defining
“torture”); Kyu Chang Lee, supra note 32, at 149 (listing the four elements of “torture”
under the CAT).
261. See CAT, supra note 36, art. 1 (listing within the definition of torture both
punishing the victim for a committed act or any kind of discrimination; Kyu Chang
Lee, supra note 32, at 160–61; supra text accompanying notes 79–89 (describing the
torture techniques executed by prison guards in the penal camps and the gender-based
violence motivated by racial discrimination).
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China’s promise to North Korea to repatriate all illegal
border crossers in the Repatriation Treaty contradicts Article 8
of China’s Extradition Law. 262 Since China enacted the
Extradition Law in 2000, the Repatriation Treaty’s conflicting
provisions, which were adopted in 1986, must give way to
China’s own legislation. 263 Therefore, the last-in-time rule
effectively prohibits China from the automatic repatriation of all
North Korean migrants.264
C. The Solution: Removing Blanket Determinations and the
Implementation of Individualized Procedures for North Korean
Migrants in China
An economic powerhouse and UN Security Council
member, China is a polarizing and globally powerful figure.265
China appears unburdened by international outcry over its
treatment of North Korean migrants and the accusations that its
repatriation policy violates the Refugee Convention and the
CAT.266 Nevertheless, China has a duty to protect the migrants
262. See U.N. Treaty Collection CAT, supra note 165 (showing that China ratified
the CAT in 1988); Repatriation Treaty, supra note 26 (showing that China entered into
the Repatriation Treaty with North Korea in 1986); PRC Extradition Law, supra note 36
(showing that China enacted the Extradition Law in 2000).
263. See VCLT, supra note 198, art. 30(3); see also Parry, supra note 225, at 1329
(discussing the last-in-time rule’s effect on conflicting provisions between statutes and
treaties).
264. See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text (providing the language in
the CAT and Extradition Law prohibiting the refoulement of individuals who are likely
to be subjected to torture or inhuman treatment upon return).
265. See Richard P. Appelbaum & Rachel Parker, China’s Move to High-Tech
Innovation: Some Regional Policy Implications, in THE ASIA-PACIFIC, REGIONALISM AND THE
GLOBAL SYSTEM 201 (Christopher M. Dent et al. eds., 2012) (explaining that “China
has emerged as a major economic player in recent years” and that “[e]ven as the
United States, Europe and Japan are plagued with sluggish economic growth and
growing financial strains, China continues with double-digit growth and sizeable
surpluses of foreign revenues”); Leo Gross, The Double Veto and the Four-Power Statement
on Voting in the Security Council, 67 HARV. L. REV. 251, 251 (1953) (noting that only the
UN Security Council’s five permanent members possess the power to veto a
resolution).
266. See Hancocks, supra note 118 (stating that China may have repatriated about
thirty North Korean migrants “[i]gnoring international protest”); Key Provisions of 1995
Treaty, supra note 144 (detailing China’s obligations to the United Nations under the
Refugee Convention); INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 33; supra text accompanying
notes 146, 150 (explaining how the UNHCR has been denied access to North Korean
migrants in China despite having declared that the migrants are “persons of concern”);
see also Ellen F. D’Angelo, Note, Non-Refoulement: The Search for a Consistent Interpretation
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who flee North Korea for the reasons expressed in the Refugee
Convention. 267 A pragmatic solution is to urge China to
reconcile its duties to the Refugee Convention and the
Repatriation Treaty, rather than honoring one at the total
expense of the other.268 This can be achieved if China removes
the “economic migrants” blanket categorization and adopts
individualized assessments for North Korean migrants seeking
refugee asylum.269
China may be concerned that creating these individualized
procedures might incidentally implicate North Korea for its
human rights violations, and thereby stymie the PRC-DPRK
alliance.270 The institutional screening procedures, however, do
not require China to abandon the Repatriation Treaty nor do
they require the government to publicly condemn North
Korea’s reported human rights abuses. 271 Instead, the
individualized assessments are justified as China’s compliance
with basic UN protocols.272
of Article 33, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279, 288 (2009) (noting the Refugee
Convention’s inability to ensure contracting party’s honoring of obligations of the
treaty because the treaty lacks enforcement power).
267. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 33; supra text accompanying
note 189 (noting that some North Korean migrants flee North Korea to escape
persecution for political opinion, religious beliefs, or membership in a social group or
class); see also supra note 67 and accompanying text (observing that some North Korean
migrants risk persecution for political opinion, religious belief, or nationality as a result
of intervening circumstances after leaving North Korea).
268. See VCLT, supra note 198, art. 26 (providing a fundamental principle that
parties to treaties must perform their obligations in good faith); Neaderland, supra
note 151, at 156–57 (“Given China’s bilateral treaty commitments, regardless of their
generality, the Chinese argument that they are bound to return North Koreans found
to be traveling illegally is not without merit in international law.”).
269. See Josh Briggs, Sur Place Refugees in the Context of Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in
Hong Kong, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 433, 446–47 (1993) (discussing individual screening
procedures Hong Kong implemented to determine refugee status for Vietnamese
migrants); Rachel Settlage, Note, No Place to Call Home—Stateless Vietnamese AsylumSeekers in Hong Kong, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 187, 200 (1997) (discussing the UNHCR’s
role in screening Vietnamese migrants).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 113–17 (discussing the PRC-DPRK alliance
and why China provides North Korea with political and economic support).
271. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (describing the individualized
screening procedures used in Hong Kong to determine refugee status for Vietnamese
migrants).
272. House Passes North Korean Human Rights Act, INTERPRETER RELEASES 1094
(2004) [hereinafter House Passes NKHR Act] (stating that the United Nations requires
China to allow the UNHCR to screen North Korean migrants); see also Charny, supra
note 176, at 97.
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1. China Should Establish an Administrative Body to Screen
North Korean Migrants
First, China should implement an internal administrative
body responsible for screening North Korean migrants who wish
to apply for governmental protection in China. 273 The
administrative body’s primary responsibility would be to
determine the migrant’s motive for departure. 274 This would
allow China to repatriate those it considers to be in China for
purely economic reasons. 275 The individualized procedures
would provide North Korean migrants the opportunity to apply
for governmental protection and offer the migrants due
process.276 These case-by-case investigations would also provide
China the ability to protect those in serious danger of
punishment for political offenses, as required by the CAT and
China’s Extradition Law. 277 Moreover, safeguarding these
individuals from the North Korean regime’s persecution for
reasons of race, political opinion, or religious belief would be
consistent with the Refugee Convention.278

273 . See supra note 270 and accompanying text (discussing Hong Kong’s
individualized screening procedure in determining refugee status of Vietnamese
migrants).
274. See Briggs supra note 270, at 446-47 (“In the screening interviews of asylum
applicants, Hong Kong examiners ask questions focusing primarily on the applicant’s
motive for departing Vietnam.”); see also Chan Kwok Bun, The Vietnamese Boat People in
Hong Kong, in THE CAMBRIDGE SURVEY OF THE WORLD MIGRATION 382 (Robin Cohen
ed., 1995) (explaining Hong Kong’s Vietnamese migrant assessment procedures so it
could “screen out” economic migrants and “screen in” political migrants).
275. See Briggs, supra note 270 (examining Hong Kong’s screening process to
determine Vietnamese migrants who are “economic migrants,” and therefore denied
refugee asylum under the Refugee Convention); Settlage, supra note 270, at 189; see also
Chan Kwok Bun, supra note 276.
276 . See supra note 270 and accompanying text (describing the process of
providing migrants seeking asylum individualized assessments).
277. According to one HNRK report, the North Korean penal code states that
defection or attempted defection is a capital crime and returned defectors “shall be
committed to a reform institution for not less than seven years. In cases where the
person commits an extremely grave concern, he or she shall be given the death
penalty.” See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 9; see also Brush, supra
note 23, at 39.
278. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 1.
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2. China Should Comply with United Nations’ Protocols and
Allow the UNHCR to Monitor the North Korean Migrants in
China
Second, China should allow the UNHCR access to North
Korean migrants to screen for refugee status under the Refugee
Convention.279 The US Congress has made revealed that “China
has obligated itself to provide the [UNHCR] with unimpeded
access to North Koreans inside its borders by its signature to the
1951 Convention[ and] 1967 Protocol.” 280 Seemingly, the
United Nations has marginal influence over China’s conduct
with regard to its treatment of North Korean migrants.281 As a
contracting party to the Refugee Convention and the CAT,
however, China may not disregard its duties to the multilateral
treaties. 282 At a minimum, China should comply with the
appropriate procedures imposed by the United Nations.
China should grant the UNHCR access to North Korean
migrants seeking refuge, but may regulate the manner in which
the procedures take place.283 That is, China may not deny the
UNHCR the opportunity to monitor North Korean migrants,
but it may determine the time, place, and the number of
migrants screened.284 China may also require that the North
279. See Charny, supra note 176, at 97 (“China is obliged to allow UNHCR
unimpeded access to North Koreans in China to review their overall situation and
conduct individual status determinations.”); see also Gahng, supra note 23, at 368;
Neaderland, supra note 151, at 175.
280. House Passes NKHR Act, supra note 273; see also Charny, supra note 176, at 97.
281. See supra note 266 and accompanying text (describing China’s authoritative
role within the United Nations).
282. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29 (prohibiting the refoulement of
migrants at risk of persecution for reasons provided in the Refugee Convention).
283. See W. Courtland Robinson, The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese
Refugees, 1989–1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck, 17 J. REFUGEE STUD. 319,
327 (2004) (providing the roles the UNHCR would perform in determining the
refugee status of Vietnamese migrants); see also Yen Tran, The Closing of the Saga of the
Vietnamese Asylum Seekers: The Implications on International Refugees and Human Rights
Laws, 17 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 463, 479 (1995) (“The core of the [Comprehensive Plan of
Action] framework is the establishment of a system of region-wise refugee status
determination, which was to be implemented ‘in accordance with national legislation
and internationally accepted practice.’”).
284 . See Robinson, supra note 284 (noting that one of the UNHCR’s
responsibilities was to observe and advise the “determination process, which was to be
carried out by a ‘qualified and competent national authority body,’” which suggests
that the nation would retain of control over screening procedures); see also Tran, supra
note 284, at 483–84.
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Korean migrants the UNHCR determines are not refugees
under the Refugee Convention be turned over to Chinese
authorities.285 The UNHCR would then have no authority to aid
the North Korean economic migrants and China may still honor
its duties to the Repatriation Treaty.286
CONCLUSION
Regardless of China’s sovereignty and its obligations to
North Korea, China’s disregard for the Refugee Convention and
the CAT should not be permitted. The most attractive solution
would be to compel China to uphold its promises to the United
Nations at the expense of the Repatriation Treaty. Yet, aspiring
to persuade China to abandon its commitments to North Korea
is a rather unrealistic objective. Moreover, China’s obstinacy in
preserving the PRC-DPRK kinship further indicates that this is
goal will remain unattainable in the foreseeable future
Imperative to fostering amicable relations with China while
protecting the safety of North Korean migrants, the global
community should look at methods in terms of practicabilitynot
push for immediate drastic changes to China’s domestic
policies. Progress towards refugee protection for all North
Korean migrants in China is the ultimate objective, but not the
first step. A meaningful starting point is to persuade China to
expunge the “economic migrant” blanket characterization of all
unauthorized North Korean migrants. Through providing
individualized assessments, North Korean migrants at the
greatest risk to their personal safety would be protected from
North Korea’s draconian laws. As Justice Douglas once famously
said, “[i]t is no requirement . . . that all evils . . . be
eradicated or none at all.”287

285. See supra text accompanying notes 202–03 (recognizing China’s duty under
international law to honor its treaty obligations in good faith).
286 . See supra text accompanying note 285 (discussing UNHCR screening
procedures whereby the nation still retains control).
287. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).

